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Abstract
We examine the appropriability problem of an inventor who brings to the market a
successful innovation that can be legally copied. We study this problem in a dynamic model
in which imitators can “enter” the market either by copying the invention at a cost or by
buying knowledge (a license) from the inventor. The first imitator to enter the market can
then resell his acquired knowledge to the remaining imitators. This dynamic interaction in
the licensing market dramatically affects the conventional wisdom on the need for intellectual
property rights. Our main result reveals that, in equilibrium, imitators delay their entry
into the market and thus the inventor retains monopoly rents for some time. Second, we
show that the innovator strictly prefers to offer non-exclusive rather than exclusive licenses
which would forbid reselling by the imitators. Last, we prove that when the innovator faces
a large number of imitators, her equilibrium reward converges to monopoly profits.
JEL: L24, O31, O34, D23, C73.
Keywords: Delay, market for technology, intellectual property rights, licensing, first
license, second license, war of attrition, hazard rate.
INTRODUCTION
Cesaroni and Mariani (2001) show that in the chemical industry a large share of technologies
are both exploited in-house and simultaneously licensed-out to potential competitors.1 Cesaroni
(2001) describes more specifically the case of Himont, a chemical firm which developed a process
of production of polypropylene.2 Although Himont was using its new technology to sell in the
market, it was also active in licensing its process, called Spheripol. The market for licenses
was characterized by intense competition. Indeed, other firms producing polypropylene with
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2A plastic material with a wide range of applications.
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different processes of production were also offering licenses. Given such behavior, entry of
new competitors was unavoidable and Himont could at least reap revenues from also licensing
aggressively. Furthermore, Arora et. al. (2001) argue that such licensing agreements among
established firms and potential competitors are common not only for chemicals but also for
electronics, software and business services.
In this paper, we build on these facts and show that such competition to provide licenses
has essential implications for the rewards of inventors and for the need for intellectual property
rights. The central premise in the economics of innovation is that, without intellectual property
rights, the rewards from innovative activities are vulnerable to ex-post expropriation by imi-
tators. Imitators immediately copy the innovation, dissipating the rents of inventors and thus
discouraging initial investments in research. This well-known appropriability problem was first
pointed out by Arrow (1962).
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine this “conventional wisdom” in the presence of a
market for licenses, that we call market for technology.3 We preserve the essential features of
the appropriability problem by examining the following situation. We consider an environment
in which imitators can legally copy an innovation at a certain cost.4 Moreover, incentives to
copy are such that, imitators would receive, after paying the imitation cost, a strictly positive
equilibrium payoff even if all of them decided to copy. Within the confines of this problem, our
point of departure is to consider the dynamics of trading between innovators and imitators in
the market for technology. Licenses may be sold in two distinct situations. First, the innovator,
under the threat of profitable imitation, may sell knowledge (a license, henceforth) to the
imitators. If entry on the market cannot be prevented, the innovator can at least reap some
licensing payments. Second, since knowledge is a non-rival good, imitators who initially buy
a license may subsequently compete with the innovator by reselling licenses to the remaining
imitators.
Before presenting our results, we make a clarifying observation. We implicitly assume that
the lack of intellectual property rights is not an obstacle for the parties to conclude mutually
beneficial licensing agreements to exchange knowledge services, designs, codes, etc. Even if
the inventor is not legally protected against imitation or reinvention, she can still choose to
sell her knowledge. It has been argued that the existence of asymmetric information can be
an obstacle to licensing in the absence of intellectual property rights. Indeed, the innovator
needs to convince the potential licensee of the value of her invention but is then exposed to
expropriation.5 We, however, consider a case in which the innovation is already on the market,
success is publicly observable, and thus asymmetries of information are minimal.
To capture the elements previously discussed and, in particular, the dynamics of trading in
the market for technology, we initially develop a model with one innovator and two imitators.
3We use the term of Arora et. al. (2001). Technology refers to knowledge rooted in engineering but also
drawn from production experience.
4The cost of reverse engineering the commercialized product. Technologies, displayed in the market, usually
conceal some details. Software is an example. The source code that is necessary for imitation can be, most of
the time, kept secret. For an excellent discussion, see Gans and Stern (2002).
5See Anton and Yao (1994, 2002).
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Our model has the following extensive form structure. Time is divided in an infinite sequence
of periods. The innovation is introduced in the market at period zero. In each period, imitators
can enter the market either by copying at a cost or by buying a license.6 Once an imitator
enters the product market, he also becomes a competitor of the inventor in the market for
technology. In other words, he will compete with the innovator by offering a license to the
remaining entrant as observed in the case of Himont.7
As a benchmark result, we establish that when the market for technology is missing both
imitators immediately enter the market by copying at period zero.8 Indeed, there is no benefit
from delaying entry since the imitation cost will remain fixed over time. By contrast, the main
result of this paper reveals that, in the presence of a market for technology, imitators will delay
their entry into the market. Thus, the inventor will appropriate monopoly rents for some time
even in the absence of intellectual property rights.
This result is due to the dynamics of the price of licenses. When a market for technology
exists, entry will take place by licensing. Before any imitator enters the market, the inventor
offers two licenses at a price equal to the imitation cost. Once an imitator enters the market
by buying what we call the first license, the price of the second license, the license that will be
sold to the remaining imitator, is determined competitively in the market for technology.
Consider, for instance, the outcome of what we call the no-delay licensing equilibrium. After
the first license is bought, the innovator and the first entrant immediately sell the second license
to the remaining imitator at a price equal to its marginal cost, zero.9 These price dynamics
ensure an equilibrium payoff to the second entrant strictly higher than the equilibrium payoff
to the first entrant. This gives rise to a war of attrition in which each imitator delays his
entry on the market with the hope that his rival will enter before him and decrease the price
of the license. Note that what drives this result is the existence, in equilibrium, of a pecuniary
externality : After the first imitator enters the market, the equilibrium price of the second license
decreases to zero.
As imitators delay their entry, the innovator retains monopoly profits for some time. The
expected duration of the delay can be considerable. Consider for instance the extreme case in
which the imitation cost is close but smaller than the present value of equilibrium triopoly prof-
its. In such an environment, when the market for technology is missing, imitators immediately
copy and the innovator only appropriates the present value of triopoly profits. We show that,
when a market for technology exists, the expected duration of the delay converges to infinity
and the innovator receives a reward arbitrarily close to the present value of monopoly profits.
In the environment described until now, it is natural to wonder whether the inventor would
not prefer to offer exclusive licenses forbidding resale by the first entrant. Our analysis uncovers
6“Enter” means use the innovation in the market. Licenses offers are take it or leave it offers.
7If imitators enter simultaneously, they obtain their corresponding payoffs and the game ends. The model
also allows an imitator who enters by copying to sell licenses. This assumption does not affect our results for the
case of two imitators and simplifies our calculations.
8By missing we mean a form of market incompleteness such that knowledge trades cannot be executed.
9Since knowledge is a durable good and we assume that transferring it implies no real cost, its marginal cost
is zero.
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that the inventor strictly prefers to sell non-exclusive licenses. If exclusive licenses were offered
both imitators would immediately buy a license at period zero. Thus, the innovator would
collect, in form of licensing fees, the imitation costs, but imitators would not delay their entry
into the market. The innovator would like to keep the license prices high for some time and then
decrease them to encourage delay. Imitators, however, anticipate that such a promise is not
credible and that the price of licenses will be the same over time. Non-exclusive licenses, on the
other hand, work as a commitment device for the innovator: by changing the structure of the
market for technology from monopoly to duopoly, they provide credibility to future reductions
in license prices.
Next, we show the existence of a key connection between the delay until the first imitator
enters the market (i.e. the delay to buy the first license) and the delay until the second license
is sold. Although the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique symmetric markov perfect
equilibrium, there can also exist other subgame perfect equilibria. All of these are characterized
by different delays until the second license is sold.10 So, the first entrant retains, until the
second license is traded, duopoly profits in the market. Thus, if the delay in the market for
technology is not too long, imitators continue “playing” a war of attrition. Otherwise, the
game becomes a preemption game in which entry takes place quasi instantaneously. In this
last case, the appropriability problem emerges once again but for a different rationale: Entry
occurs immediately when imitators expect that knowledge will be slowly diffused in the market
for technology.
Last, we extend our model to the case of a large number of potential imitators. We find
the striking result that the innovator’s equilibrium payoff converges to monopoly profits. The
intuition, in one of the two cases we consider, is as follows. The unique symmetric markov perfect
equilibrium in the market for technology is such that after the first entry, the inventor and the
first imitator propose licenses at a zero price, almost instantaneously, to all remaining imitators.
If the number of potential imitators is large enough, the profits of the first entrant will thus be
significantly reduced and can be insufficient to cover the initial entry cost.11 All imitators would
thus shy away from initially entering the market, effectively granting the innovator monopoly
rents forever.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. The benchmark
result when the market for technology is missing is shown in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish
our main result. In Section 4, we explore two themes: the choice of exclusive versus non-exclusive
licenses and the multiplicity of perfect equilibria. Section 5 extends our model to consider a
large number of imitators. Section 6 examines the related literature. Section 7 concludes by
discussing several issues raised by our paper and by proposing a different perspective on the
increasing popularity of secrecy as a means to protect innovative rents.
1. THE MODEL
We consider an economy in which an inventor (“she”), denoted by s, has developed an
10Although in all of them the license is sold at a zero price.
11This follows since all of remaining imitators will find at least weakly profitable to enter.
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innovation that represents an improvement over the previous state of the art.12 The innovation
is not protected by intellectual property rights.13 Two imitators, denoted by h ∈ {i, j}, may
“adopt” the innovation by either: (i) Using a costly imitation technology (henceforth, copying);
or by (ii) Buying technical knowledge from the inventor (henceforth, licensing).
We first describe the product market (hereafter, market). Time is broken into a countable
infinite sequence of intervals, each called a period of real time length ∆ ∈ R++.14 The innovation
is introduced to the market at the beginning of period zero. At that date, the imitators might
already be producing with an older technology or selling an older product.15 To simplify the
exposition, without loss of generality, the profits of the imitators who do not use the innovation
are normalized to zero.
Imitators can adopt the innovation either by copying, c, or by licensing, `. To clarify the
terminology that we will use throughout the paper, when an imitator adopts the innovation at
period t we will say that he enters the market. Besides, we will describe him as active in the
market from that period on. We assume that the innovator and each active imitator obtain the
same equilibrium profit flow regardless of their mode of entry. We denote by pin the equilibrium
profit flow when n firms are active in the market.16 Moreover, we make the standard assumption
that pi1 > 2pi2 > 3pi3 > 0.
We assume that all parties are risk neutral and maximize the sum of their discounted
expected payoffs (i.e., profits plus potential licensing payments). Let r > 0 be the (common)
rate of time preference and δ := exp(−r∆) ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor between time periods.
The profits of a firm during a period in which n firms are active in the market is
∫ ∆
0 pine
−rtdt =
(1− δ)Πn, where Πn :=
∫∞
0 pine
−rtdt = (pin/r) is the present value of market profits when there
are n active firms.
Next, we provide an outline of the imitation technology and the market for technology. The
imitation technology can be described as follows. An imitator by spending, at any period t, an
amount of real resources κ ∈ R++ obtains instantaneously a perfect version of the invention.
We interpret κ, the imitation cost, as a one-time sunk cost that must be incurred to reverse
engineer the fine details of the innovation. An alternative to copying is to enter the market by
licensing. The inventor, being the creator of the innovation, possesses the required (indivisible)
knowledge to transfer the innovation. If an imitator buys this piece of knowledge at period t,
he will be able to instantaneously obtain a perfect version of the innovation at zero cost.17
We make the following simplifying assumptions regarding licensing agreements. First, we
12The innovation may be either a product improvement or a cost reducing process.
13The lack of intellectual property rights is formalized in Assumption 1 of section 2. This assumption postulates
that: (i) Copy is not legally forbidden; and that (ii) The present value of equilibrium profits when all imitators
copy the invention is higher than the imitation cost.
14In what follows we will refer to period (t+ k)∆ directly as period t+ k for all k ∈ {0, 1, ..}.
15Our model is sufficiently general to encompass situations in which the innovation is either drastic or non-
drastic.
16These profits depend on market conditions, the type of competition and the features of the innovation. To
make our argument most general we specify equilibrium profits in reduced form.
17The zero cost assumption is a convenient normalization. Further, to simplify, we also assume that transferring
knowledge from the inventor to the imitators implies no real cost.
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suppose that licenses are fixed-fee contracts.18 At those periods t, such that no imitator has
entered the market yet, we denote by ptsh the price at which the inventor offers to sell a license
to imitator h ∈ {i, j}. If the inventor offers no license to imitator h ∈ {i, j} we denote that by
a price ptsh = +∞. Second, the licenses offered by the innovator can be either exclusive or non-
exclusive. If an imitator enters the market before his rival by signing a non-exclusive licensing
contract with the inventor, he can then resell the acquired knowledge to the other imitator in
subsequent periods. We also assume that if an imitator enters by copying, he also becomes
a competitor of the inventor in the market for technology.19 Specifically, at each period t, in
which imitator i is active in the market and entered by copying or by purchasing a non-exclusive
license and imitator j has not entered the market yet, the innovator offers a license at a price
ptsj to imitator j and imitator i offers a license at a price p
t
ij .
Formally, relevant economic activity occurs within the framework of the following extensive
form game. At the beginning of each period in which no imitator has entered yet:
(i) The innovator announces, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a pair of licensing contracts (i.e.,
a pair of prices ptsi and p
t
sj and the exclusivity feature of the contract);
(ii) The imitators simultaneously decide whether to enter the market or not and, conditional
on entrance, how to enter: They choose either c or `.
The game continues in this manner as long as no imitator chooses to enter the market. If
at period t both imitators enter simultaneously, the game ends and all parties receive their
corresponding payoffs. However, if only one of them enters the market, say imitator i, the game
continues as follows. From the beginning of period t+ 1 on:
(i) If imitator i enters by either copying or purchasing a non-exclusive license, he and
the innovator simultaneously announce prices for a single license: ptij and p
t
sj respectively.
Otherwise, when imitator i enters the market by buying an exclusive-license, only the innovator
offers a license contract to imitator j; and
(ii) Imitator j decides whether to enter or not and, conditional on entrance, how to enter:
By either copying or buying a license from one of the sellers if it is feasible for imitator i to sell
a license (i.e., if imitator i entered the market by copying or by buying a non-exclusive license).
Until imitator j decides to enter the market, the innovator and imitator i receive their
corresponding market profits. The game continues as long as there is still at least one imitator
who has not entered the market yet.
Payoffs in this extensive form are calculated as follows. Suppose that the following outcome
occurs: Imitator i enters the market at period t and imitator j at period t + 1. Besides, both
imitators enter by buying a non-exclusive license from the innovator. The innovator’s payoff at
period 0 is then
Vs = (1− δt)Π1 + δt
[
(1− δ)Π2 + ptsi
]
+ δt+1
[
pt+1sj +Π3
]
(1)
18In a previous version we showed that the results were unchanged when we allowed for two part tariffs and
linear demand.
19The results given here do not actually depend on this assumption. However it simplifies our calculations
substantially.
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Similarly, the present value of the payoff for each imitator is
Vi = δt
[
(1− δ)Π2 − ptsi
]
+ δt+1Π3; Vj = δt+1(Π3 − pt+1sj ) (2)
Last, we assume that all parties observe the history up to the beginning of period t and that
the buyer(s) observed the price offers and the nature of the contract made by the seller(s), at
the beginning of period t in the market for technology. A history at the beginning of period
t consists of a sequence of license contracts proposed by the seller(s), a sequence of entry
decisions chosen by the imitators and a sequence of decisions of how to enter the market. We
use subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) as our solution concept. That is, we require strategies
to form a Nash equilibrium following any feasible history. In certain sections of the paper, we
restrict our attention to Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE). In MPE strategies are functions
only of payoff-relevant histories, determined in our model by the number of imitators who are
active in the market at each time period.
2. BENCHMARK: APPROPRIATION WITHOUT A MARKET FOR
TECHNOLOGY
We analyze, in this section, the SPE when the market for technology is missing. Thus,
imitators can only enter the market by copying. We establish that both imitators enter the
market without delay at the beginning of period zero. This result can be considered as the
foundation for the “conventional wisdom” calling for intellectual property rights.
It is important to note that although we consider an economy without intellectual property
rights, the imitation cost κ works as an entry barrier determining a natural measure of protection
for the inventor.20 A value of κ such that κ > Π2 is sufficient to completely protect the inventor
from imitation. Indeed, given that the imitation cost is strictly higher than the present value
of duopoly profits, no imitator copies in equilibrium. The innovator therefore retains monopoly
profits Π1, even though intellectual property rights are not protected. The goal of this paper
is to study the dynamics of entry and appropriation with and without a market for technology.
Thus, to make our problem interesting, we impose the following assumption on imitation costs
through Sections 2-4.
Assumption 1: 0 < κ < Π3
In an economy in which copying is legal, Assumption 1 ensures that it is profitable for both
imitators. Under assumption 1, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the market for technology is missing. Then
(i) there is a unique SPE in which both imitators copy immediately at period t = 0
(ii) the equilibrium payoffs for the innovator and the imitators are Π3 and Π3 − κ respectively.
20Actually, one can interpret intellectual property protection as policy measures that augment the level of κ.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
When the market for technology is missing both imitators enter the market immediately.
Indeed, there is no benefit from delaying entry since the entry cost will remain fixed throughout
their planning horizon at the value of the imitation cost, κ. Furthermore, by delaying entry,
imitators lose profits during the time periods in which they do not use the innovation. Therefore,
if entry occurs, it will take place at period zero for sure. Assumption 1 assures that entry is
indeed profitable for both imitators.21
Proposition 1 summarizes the “conventional wisdom” justifying the need for intellectual
property rights. In the absence of such protection, imitators enter immediately following a
successful innovation and compete away the rents of the initial inventor. Foreseeing the risk
that their reward, Π3, might be insufficient to cover their research costs, innovators might thus
shy away from initially investing in research. The purpose of this paper is to challenge this
line of thought and to show that delay can actually occur in equilibrium when a market for
technology exists.
3. APPROPRIATION IN THE PRESENCE OF A MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY
This section presents our main result when a market for technology exists: We show that, in
equilibrium, imitators will delay their entry into the market and thus the innovator will collect
monopoly profits for some time. We assume that the inventor is constrained to offer non-
exclusive licensing contracts. Although this might initially appear to be a strong assumption,
we show in section 4 that the inventor will prefer to offer such non-exclusive rather than exclusive
licensing agreements. To present the intuition of this seemingly paradoxical result we must first
identify the sources of rents for the inventor.
A. Copying and Licensing
Because we start studying the MPE of our game, in order to ultimately determine the
equilibrium entry times of the imitators, we need to analyze two different types of subgames.
First, the subgame which starts at the beginning of period τ ≥ t+ 1 after any feasible history
in which a single imitator has entered at the beginning of period τ ≥ t. Second, the subgame
which starts at the beginning of period τ ≥ t after any feasible history in which entry has
not occurred yet.22 For clarity and future reference, we call the first subgame, the competitive
subgame and the second one, the monopoly subgame.23
We first examine the competitive subgame. Specifically, suppose that imitator i has entered
at the beginning of period t. Both the innovator and imitator i can, in subsequent periods, offer
21Both obtain profits of Π3 − κ > 0.
22Notice that after a history in which the imitators simultaneously enter, the game effectively ends. At every
period the firms just compete on the product market.
23Formally, we consider a partition which maps the set of all feasible histories of the game into a set of two
disjoint and exhaustive subsets of this set. The partition mapping that defines the payoff relevant history is
defined by the number of imitators who are active in market at each feasible history.
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licensing contracts to imitator j.24 The SPE of this subgame will be characterized by prices pτsj
and pτij of the licenses and by the choice of imitator j relative to the timing and mode of entry.
For presentation purposes, a complete characterization of pure strategy SPE of this subgame
will be performed in section 4. In this section, to emphasize our main ideas, we focus our
attention on the MPE of this subgame that we call the no-delay licensing Nash equilibrium.25
For simplicity, we present here the equilibrium outcome that results when the precepts of the
no-delay licensing Nash equilibrium are followed.
Definition 1 In the no-delay licensing Nash equilibrium a license is sold to imitator j imme-
diately at period t+ 1 at a zero price.
In the no-delay licensing equilibrium, a license is immediately sold to the remaining imitator
at a price equal to its marginal cost. In the appendix, we present strategies that give rise to this
equilibrium outcome and show that they form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the competitive
subgame. Those strategies prescribe that both the innovator and imitator i propose licenses
at a zero price in every period. Imitator j then has no incentive to delay his entry since the
license is offered to him at its minimal price. Furthermore, for both sellers it is a best response
to offer the license at a zero price given that his rival adopts the same strategy. We call the
license that is offered competitively after the first entry the second license.26
It is important to point out that the no-delay licensing equilibrium is not necessarily the
unique SPE of this subgame. Indeed there could exist other SPE in which both the innovator
and imitator i keep prices high for some periods of time and imitator j delays his entry to
benefit from a lower price in later periods. In section 4, we examine the implications that this
multiplicity of SPE has for our main results. We also prove the existence of a condition that
guarantees that the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique SPE of this subgame. However
these issues are not necessary to understand the intuition of the mechanism that we highlight
and so we discuss them in depth in section 4.
We now examine the expected payoffs of the imitators when the no-delay licensing equilib-
rium is being played. Imitator j, the follower imitator (i.e., the imitator who enters second),
will enter at the beginning of period t+ 1 by obtaining a license at a zero price. His expected
equilibrium payoff in period t units is therefore
Vj = δΠ3 (3)
The expected payoff of imitator i depends on his mode of entry. If he entered the market by
copying, his expected payoff in period t units would be
V ci = (1− δ)Π2 + δΠ3 − κ
24Imitator i entered either by copying or by signing a non-exclusive license. In both cases he can compete on
the market for technology (i.e transfer knowledge to imitiator j for a fee).
25The no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique MPE.
26This types of competition was observed in the case of Himont mentionned in the introduction.
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as: (i) He obtains a flow of duopoly profits during period t; and: (ii) Since the no-delay equilib-
rium is played, the remaining imitator will immediately enter at period t+ 1 and therefore his
profits decrease to triopoly profits pi3 thereon.27 If he instead entered the market by licensing,
his expected payoff in period t units would be28
V `i = (1− δ)Π2 + δΠ3 − psi
Observe that the only distinction between V ci and V
`
i resides in the entry cost. In particular,
neither by licensing nor by copying, does imitator i expects to obtain future licensing profits.
Price competition in the market for technology will reduce licensing profits to zero.
Therefore, to determine the mode of entry of imitators we need to examine the prices at
which the inventor offers to sell the licenses. We thus turn our attention to the monopoly
subgame. We establish that the inventor will always offer two licenses at prices smaller or equal
to the imitation cost. Thus, the imitators will always enter the market by licensing rather than
by copying.
Lemma 1 In the monopoly subgame, the innovator offers two licenses at prices psi ≤ κ and
psj ≤ κ. Thus, copying never occurs in a MPE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The innovator can always do weakly better
by adding a second license at a price equal to κ at every period than by offering only one
license. By adopting this licensing strategy, she does not change the entry costs and thus the
entry decision of the imitators (the previously excluded imitator could always enter by copying
if he paid the imitation cost κ) but collects licensing revenues when the imitators do enter the
market.29 Given these license prices, imitators, if they enter the market, will always do so by
purchasing a license from the inventor and not by copying.
We still need to establish the exact license prices that the innovator will set. But first we
summarize the payoffs of the imitators. If the leader imitator (i.e., the one who enters first,
denoted by superscript 1), enters at period t, then, according to equation (3) and lemma 1, the
payoffs for the leader and the follower imitator in period t units are
V 1h = (1− δ)Π2 + δΠ3 − psh; V 2h = δΠ3 (4)
for h ∈ {i, j}. On the other hand, if both imitators enter simultaneously their payoffs in period
27Observe that if we assumed that imitator i could not become a seller were he copied the invention instead
of buying knowledge from the inventor, he would obtain the same expected payoff in period t units. Indeed,
in equilibrium, at the beginning of period t + 1, the inventor would sell knowledge to imitator j and he would
immediately accept.
28Recall that in an MPE prices do not depend on calendar time but just on the number of imitators who are
active in the market.
29The same idea applies to show that it is preferable to offer two licenses at a price of κ rather than no license
at all.
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t units are
V bi = Π3 − psi;V bj = Π3 − psj (5)
A number of properties of these payoffs underlie our main results. First, we observe that as δ
goes to one (or equivalently as ∆ shrinks to zero), the payoff of the follower imitator is always
strictly higher than the payoff of the leader imitator. This, formally, ensures a “war of attrition”
between the imitators that yields delay to enter the market. Each imitator delays his entry time
into the market with the hope of buying the second license and thus to pay a zero price for
knowledge in the future. Second, we note that when the inventor raises the price of knowledge
ps she increases the difference between V 1 and V 2 and thus she magnifies the incentives of the
imitators to wait longer before entering the market.
B. Appropriation in the absence of legal protection
Here we present our main result. We obtain the equilibrium license prices chosen by the
innovator and the equilibrium entry time of the imitators. For tractability, we present our
results for the limit of our discrete-timing game as the length of each period becomes arbitrarily
small. For that, we initially fix a ∆ > 0 and then we inspect the limiting behavior of markov
perfect equilibria when ∆ shrinks to zero. Characterizing the limiting case has one important
advantage: We are able to explicitly compute the innovator’s equilibrium expected payoff and
to compare it with the payoff that she obtains when the market for technology is missing.
Because the innovator will set license prices below or at most equal to the imitation cost, we
directly denote the behavior strategy for imitator h ∈ {i, j} by ψh(psi, psj) and we interpreted
it as the probability of buying a license at period t conditional on reaching period t. The
innovator’s strategy must specify at each period at which entry has not happened yet a pair
of license prices {psi, psj}. These strategies are (part) of a MPE if: (i) For any pair of license
prices chosen by the innovator, the pair of behavior strategies selected by the imitators are, for
each period, a Nash equilibrium between the imitators; and (ii) Given the equilibrium behavior
strategies of the imitators, the innovator chooses a pair of license prices that maximizes her
expected payoff. We say that a MPE is symmetric if when psi = ps = psj , then ψi(ps) = ψj(ps).
As we observed before when the length of a period, ∆, shrinks to zero, the payoff of the
follower imitator becomes strictly higher than the payoff of the leader imitator. This gives rise
to a “war of attrition” in which each imitator delays his time to enter the market with the hope
of buying the second license at a zero price. Meanwhile, the innovator, being the sole user of
the innovation in the market, appropriates temporal monopoly profits. Proposition 2, the main
result of this paper, formally captures this economic idea.
Proposition 2 As the length of each period, ∆, converges to zero, there exists a unique sym-
metric MPE such that
(i) the innovator sets prices psi = psj = κ for the licenses;
(ii) the distribution of entry times of each imitator converges to an exponential distribution with
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hazard rate equal to
λ =
r (Π3 − κ)
κ
(iii) the inventor’s equilibrium expected payoff is
Vs (κ) =
pi1
r + 2λ
+
2λ
r + 2λ
(Π3 + κ)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Result (ii) of proposition 2 indicates that the limiting distribution of entry times is an ex-
ponential distribution with hazard rate equal to λ. This is a typical result in war of attrition
games. We examine next, in subsection C, the parameters that influence the size of this instan-
taneous entry rate for each imitator and the magnitude of the innovator’s equilibrium payoff
given in result (iii).
The equilibrium entry times of the imitators are used to derive result (i) which describes
the optimal pricing decision of the inventor. The inventor chooses psi and psj to maximize her
expected payoff. If the innovator sets the same price ps for both imitators, the hazard rate is
given by
λ(ps) =
r (Π3 − ps)
ps
and the expected payoff for the inventor can be expressed as
Vs(ps) =
pi1
r + 2λ
+
2λ
r + 2λ
(Π3 + ps)
In this synthetic form, we observe that the license price ps has several effects. First, and most
obvious, a higher price for knowledge raises the licensing revenues that the inventor collects
when she sells the first license (i.e. the license to the first imitator). Second, a higher price
for knowledge decreases the hazard rate λ(ps) and thus delays entry into the market by the
imitators. Indeed, as ps increases, it becomes more attractive for the imitators to delay their
entry times with the hope of buying the second license at a zero price if the rival enters first.
There is nevertheless a countervailing effect: As imitators delay their entry times, the licensing
profits are obtained later, potentially decreasing the overall period-0 expected payoff of the
inventor. Result (i) demonstrates that this third effect is dominated by the previous ones. The
inventor chooses the license price that maximizes the delay in entry times (i.e., the license price
that minimizes the hazard rate). The incentive to preserve monopoly rents for a longer period
clearly dominate the potential loss in licensing revenues.
The essential message of proposition 2 is that, when a market for technology exists, the
inventor retains monopoly profits for a time period, even in complete absence of intellectual
property rights. The innovator benefits in two ways from the existence of a market for tech-
nology. She collects licensing revenues but, more importantly, the dynamics of the equilibrium
license prices in this market encourage imitators to delay their entry times and thus the inventor
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preserves monopoly rents for a time period.
C. Sources of rents for the innovator
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to discuss the sources and the magnitude of the additional rents
obtained by the inventor in the presence of a market for technology. Proposition 1 demonstrates
that in the absence of a market for technology, imitators immediately copy and the inventor
obtains an equilibrium payoff of Π3. Proposition 2, shows that the incremental payoff that
accrues to the inventor when a market for technology exists is
Vs(κ)−Π3 = [pi1 − pi3](r + 2λ) +
2λ
(r + 2λ)
κ (6)[
Rewards
from Delayed Entry
]
+
[
Licensing
Revenues
]
Equation (6) illustrates the fact that the innovator obtains both direct revenues from licensing
and indirect benefits from delayed entry.
The length of time during which the innovator retains monopoly rents depends on the
equilibrium hazard rate, λ, that, in a symmetric equilibrium, has a compelling economic inter-
pretation. Observe that, if entry has not happened yet, the opportunity cost for each imitator
of delaying entry an infinitesimal amount of time equals r (Π3 − κ): the flow equilibrium payoff
that he would obtain if he were the leader imitator. But, on the other hand, the benefit for
each imitator of delaying entry an infinitesimal amount of time equals κ: the difference in the
equilibrium payoffs between being the leader and the follower imitator. This benefit is only
obtained if the rival imitator enters first: An event that happens with hazard rate equal to λ.
Thus, in a behavior symmetric equilibrium, λκ = r (Π3 − κ), implying that λ = r (Π3 − κ) /κ.
So, the expected duration of the time period during which the innovator retains monopoly
rents30
1
2λ
=
(κ/2)
r (Π3 − κ) (7)
depends not only on the benefit of waiting (i.e. the absolute value of κ) but also on the
opportunity cost of waiting (i.e. (Π3 − κ)). Fixing the values for r and Π3, the key parameter of
our model is, κ, the imitation cost. When κ goes to zero, the benefits of waiting are completely
eliminated and the imitators enter the market immediately at time 0. When κ increases,
the expected duration of “monopoly” time and the overall rents of the innovator increase.31
Moreover, note that when κ increases not only the benefits of waiting increase but also the
opportunity costs of waiting decrease. As κ goes to Π3 the opportunity cost of waiting goes to
zero and, in the limit, entry into the product market never happens. Thus, even in the absence
of intellectual property rights, the inventor obtains the present value of monopoly profits. We
summarize the preceding discussion in the following corollary.
30The formula belows follows immediately from the definition of expectation for an exponential distribution
with parameter equal to 2λ (i.e., there are two imitators).
31This statement can be easily confirmed by: (i) Totally differentiating Vs(κ) with respect to κ; (ii) Considering
that dλ/dκ = − 1
κ
[r + λ] < 0; and finally: (iii) Using assumption 1.
13
Corollary 1 Suppose that a market for technology exists. Then
(i) the expected duration of monopoly time and the inventor’s expected equilibrium payoff are
strictly increasing in the imitation cost, κ
(ii) the inventor’s expected equilibrium payoff converges monotonically to the present value of
monopoly profits, Π1, as κ converges to Π3.
We finish this discussion with an illustrative example
Example
Consider a product that generates monopoly profits of pi1 = $0.1 million per year. Suppose
r = 10 percent. An innovator protected by an infinitely long patent will obtain discounted
profits of Π1 = $1M. Suppose that market demand is well approximated by a linear demand
and that marginal cost is constant. If firms compete on quantities, we can the derive the value
of triopoly profits: pi3 = $0.025M and Π3 = $0.25M. We then vary κ between 0 and Π3.
We present the results in the following table. In the first column, we report the duration
of monopoly time (i.e., the expected delay in entry). In the second, we report the discounted
profits of the innovator derived from result (iii) in Proposition 2. In the last three columns, we
decompose the percentage contributions of the different revenue streams: (i) Percentage coming
from monopoly profits before entry ( pi1r+2λ); (ii) Percentage coming from triopoly profits after
entry ( 2λr+2λΠ3); and: (iii) Percentage obtained from licensing revenues (
2λ
r+2λκ).
κ ($M)
Dur. Mon.
Time (years)
Discounted
Profits
of innovator ($M)
% Before
Entry
% After
Entry
% Licensing
Revenues
0.01 0.21 0.275 7 89 4
0.02 0.43 0.3 14 80 6
0.04 0.95 0.35 25 65 10
0.07 1.94 0.43 38 49 14
0.1 3.33 0.51 49 37 15
0.2 20 0.82 82 10 8
0.24 120 0.96 96 2 2
0.249 1245 0.99 100 0 0
As κ increases the expected time of first entry and the expected equilibrium payoff of the
innovator increase. If the cost of reverse engineering the process is $10000, the innovator expects
to retain monopoly profits for more than two months and overall to obtain profits of $275000
(compared to $250000 without licensing markets). However, if the cost of reverse engineering is
$100000 entry would be prevented on average for close to 3 years and a half and the innovator
would obtain profits of $510000, a bit more than half the present value of monopoly profits.32
32Note that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no good estimate of the cost of reverse engineering. Maurer
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We observe, in accordance with Corollary 1, that the payoff of the innovator converges to
monopoly as κ converges to Π3. It is interesting to discuss the effects reported in last three
columns. The percentage of the overall equilibrium payoff coming from the monopoly position
before entry naturally increases with κ. Conversely the percentage of the overall equilibrium
payoff coming from triopoly profits after entry decreases with the imitation cost. The more
interesting result relates to licensing revenues. We notice that, as κ increases, the percentage of
revenue coming from licensing initially increases and then decreases. Indeed, as κ increases, the
instantaneous licensing revenues increase. This effect is linear in κ. However, as κ increases,
these revenues are obtained at a later date. Given that the effect of κ on delay is non linear, the
second effect dominates as κ goes to Π3. Therefore, the discounted value of expected licensing
revenues initially increases with κ and then decreases as the effect of the delay starts dominating.
4. EXCLUSIVITY, DELAY AND APPROPRIATION: FURTHER RESULTS
Section 3 introduced our main result. However, to keep the exposition simple, we concen-
trated on non-exclusive contracts and focused on one particular equilibrium in the competitive
subgame. In this section we examine these issues more thoroughly. First, we study the case
of exclusive contracts and show that the innovator will not use them in equilibrium. We then
characterize the full set of symmetric perfect equilibrium and identify a condition under which
the equilibrium studied in section 3 is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
A. Exclusive contracts
In the previous section we constrained the innovator to offer non-exclusive licenses. This
might appear overly restrictive. Certainly, exclusive licenses might be attractive to the innova-
tor as they remove competition in the market for technology. Nevertheless, in this section, we
show that the innovator will choose to offer non-exclusive licenses rather than exclusive licensing
contracts. We suppose in this sub-section (as opposed to sub-section B) that, if non-exclusive
licenses were sold, the no-delay licensing equilibrium would be played in the competitive sub-
game.
We first examine the subgame that follows after the first imitator, say imitator i, enters the
market by signing an exclusive licensing agreement with the inventor. The innovator then has
to decide at every period at what price to offer the license to the remaining imitator. We then
obtain the following intermediate result.
Lemma 2 The unique SPE of the subgame starting at t+ 1 after entry at t of imitator i with
an exclusive license, is such that the innovator offers a licensing contract at a price κ at every
period and imitator j enters immediately at t+ 1.
and Scotchmer (2002) argue nevertheless that in certain industries it is reasonable to assume that the cost of
an independent inventor is similar to the cost of the initial innovator. In our context this would imply that the
innovator could cerainly cover his invention cost.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The innovator would ideally want to promise imitator j to lower the license price in the
future to delay his entry into the market. However, this promise is not credible as once that
period comes, the innovator has an incentive to keep prices high and it is optimal for the
imitator to accept such high offers rather than spend the imitation cost. Therefore, the unique
SPE is such that imitator j enters immediately by paying a price of κ to the innovator. We
now analyze the SPE of the entire game.
Proposition 3 The unique SPE when the inventor offers exclusive licenses is such that
(i) both imitators enter immediately at period t = 0 by buying licenses for a price of κ
(ii) the innovator’s equilibrium payoff V es = Π3 + 2κ, is strictly smaller than the equilibrium
payoff that she obtains when she offers non-exclusive licenses.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is interesting to compare the results of Propositions 1 and 3. In both cases, imitators
correctly perceive that their entry cost will remain fixed in the future and thus decide to enter
the market immediately at period zero. However, in the case of Proposition 3, the entry cost
remains constant over time due to the exclusivity clauses contained in the licensing contracts.
When using exclusive contracts, the innovator cannot commit to lower the price of the second
license in the future and, from the point of view of the imitators, she replicates the same
economic environment as if the market for technology were missing. The innovator, however,
obtains higher rents: She appropriates, in form of licensing revenues, what before were lost
imitation costs.
Result (ii) compares the equilibrium payoff for the innovator in the exclusive and non-
exclusive cases. The benefits of offering exclusive contracts is that licensing revenues are higher
in absolute terms and are obtained earlier (at period 0). However, by offering exclusive con-
tracts, the innovator is unable to commit to lower the price of the second license. Non-exclusive
contracts allow the innovator to make this commitment by introducing competition on the mar-
ket for technology. The imitators therefore delay their entry into the product market. Result
(ii) shows that the extra monopoly profits collected due to this delay are larger than the lost
licensing revenues.
Some suggestive empirical evidence seems to confirm the importance of non-exclusive con-
tracts in the absence of patents or when patent rights are “weak”. Anand and Khanna (2000),
report the percentage of non-exclusive licenses signed in their sample of contracts.33 For chem-
icals (mostly drugs in the sample), the percentage of non exclusive licenses is 12.36%, for
computers 28.48% and for electronics 30.35%. This evidence can be confronted to the data
collected in the Carnegie Mellon Survey, reported by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000), that
asked managers what are the effective mechanism to appropriate the returns from their firms’
innovations. For drugs, 50% of managers reported patents were effective, for computers 41%
33See Table III(i) in thier paper.
16
and for electronics 21%.34 Thus, the sectors least likely to use patents are also those in which
non-exclusive licenses are most prevalent. Our mechanism indeed suggests that in the absence
of patents these contracts can become an effective way to protect innovations.
B. Multiplicity of Equilibria
The results of section 3 were derived under the assumption that the no-delay licensing
equilibrium would be played. This equilibrium is the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium. In
this section, we focus on Subgame Perfect Equilibria. The potential multiplicity of (symmetric)
SPE of our timing game stems in part from the fact that there are multiple SPE when the
sellers, in the market for technology, compete to sell the second license.35
We obtain two important results. First, we determine the existence of a condition under
which the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique perfect equilibrium of the competitive
subgame. This emphasizes the importance of the results of section 3. Second, when this
condition is not satisfied, we capture a rich relationship between delay to enter the market (i.e.
delay to buy the first license) and delay to trade the second license. More precisely: if the length
of time until the second license is traded is not too long, imitators will still delay their entry
times into the market. Otherwise, they will end up entering the market quasi instantaneously
at time zero.
B1. Delay and Multiplicity of Equilibria
To simplify the exposition, for most of this section, we focus on the continuous time formula-
tion of our model.36 In this context, competition to sell the second license starts instantaneously
at time t, with the first entry of, say, imitator i. Let t2 ≥ t be the time at which the second
license is sold. The delay in trading the second license since the time of the first entry is then
d2 := (t2 − t) ≥ 0. We denote by d˜2 := t˜2− t > 0 the maximum amount of time that imitator j
is willing to wait to buy the license at a zero price rather than copying immediately at time t.
From these definitions, it follows that the no-delay licensing equilibrium corresponds to a delay
d2 = 0 and that d˜2 satisfies Π3 − κ = Π3e−r ed2 . Proposition 4 describes the (symmetric) pure
strategy SPE of the competitive subgame.
Proposition 4 Suppose that a market for technology exists. Then
(i) if 2Π3 > Π2 the no-delay licensing equilibrium is the unique SPE of the competitive subgame.
(ii) if 2Π3 ≤ Π2, for each d2 ∈
[
0, d˜2
]
there exists a SPE in which imitator j enters the market
at time t2 = t+ d2 by buying the license at a zero price.
34See Table I in their paper.
35We return to the assumption that the inventor offers non-exclusive licensing contracts before the first entry
happens.
36We interpret the continuous time version of our model as an approximation to our previous discrete time-game
for the limiting case in which ∆→ 0.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The first part of proposition 4 establishes the important result that for some market games,
the unique SPE is the no-delay licensing equilibrium, in which a license is sold immediately.
For linear demand and Cournot competition, this condition is always satisfied. The intuition of
the result is the following. When 2Π3 > Π2 the market is such that for any potential candidate
equilibrium with delay in the market for technology, a profitable deviation will exist for one of
the licensors. Indeed, selling a license to imitator j at the highest acceptable price, Π3, will allow
the deviator to collect profits of 2Π3 rather than the duopoly profits guaranteed in equilibrium.
Thus, if this condition is satisfied, the unique equilibrium of the competitive subgame is the
no-delay licensing equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that the degree of competitiveness of the technology and product
markets are inversely related. A product market such that 2Π3 > Π2 can be characterized as
not highly competitive: profits erode slowly with an increase in the number of firms. However,
such a product market will create a very competitive market for technology in which licensors
will be unable to coordinate on keeping prices high.
The second part of the proposition points out, however, that when the condition is not
satisfied, the competition game that follows after the first entry accepts a multiplicity of SPE.
All of these SPE share a common feature: the second license is always sold at a price equal
to zero. The intuition is simple. Because the seller with the lowest price will serve the entire
market (i.e., imitator j), each seller has an incentive to undercut his rival. However, all of these
SPE are characterized by different delays before the second license is traded. An outcome such
that the license is sold with a delay equal to d2 > 0 is a perfect equilibrium for two reasons.37
First, imitator j, given that d2 ≤ d˜2, prefers waiting that amount of time to buy a license
at a zero price rather than copying immediately. Second, the sellers, when 2Π3 ≤ Π2, prefer
collecting duopoly profits in the market rather than deviating and receiving licensing payments.
Equilibrium payoffs, in period t units, for the leader and follower imitator may now be
written as
V1 = (1− e−rd2)Π2 + e−rd2Π3 − ps;V2 = e−rd2Π3 (8)
where d2 ∈
[
0, d˜2
]
is a given equilibrium delay.38 The existence of delay in the market for
technology causes one conceptual novelty. The first imitator collects duopoly profits in the
market prior to the second entry. It may thus be worthwhile for imitators to become leaders
rather than followers. More precisely, as equation (9) highlights, if d2 is sufficiently high V1
could be higher than V2. So, for low values of d2 our timing-game corresponds to a “war of
attrition” whereas for sufficiently large values of d2 the imitators play a “preemption game”.
B2. Delay and Appropriation
37The multiplicity of equilibria is not due to well-known repeated game theory arguments: None of these
equilibria is sustained by a punishment scheme.
38To simplify the exposition, we assume that the inventor follows a non-discriminatory pricing policy.
18
We first establish that when the delay on the market for technology is not too long, the
imitators still delay their entry into the market.39 Proposition 5 is indeed a generalization of
Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 Let d2 ∈
[
0, d̂2
)
for d̂2 := (1/r) ln (Π2/ (Π2 − κ)) then
(i) the innovator sets a price ps = κ for the licenses;
(ii) the distribution of entry times of each imitator is exponential with hazard rate equal to
λ =
r
[
(Π3 − κ) + (Π2 −Π3) (1− e−rd2)
]
[κ− (1− e−rd2)Π2]
(iii) the inventor’s equilibrium payoff is
Vs(κ, d2) =
pi1
(r + 2λ)
+
2λ
[
(Π3 + κ) + (Π2 −Π3) (1− e−rd2)
]
(r + 2λ)
Proof. See the Appendix.
As in Proposition 2, result (i) indicates that the innovator sets a price of κ for the licenses
and result (ii) shows that imitators delay their entry into the product market. However, result
(iii) establishes that, compared to the expression of Proposition 2, the innovator now collects
duopoly profits after the first entry.40 However when d2 increases, the equilibrium hazard rate
also increases and therefore the expected duration of monopoly time for the innovator decreases.
From this discussion, a natural question emerges: In which SPE does the innovator receive
her highest payoff? Unfortunately, the work of several countervailing forces makes difficult to
analytically determine her best SPE payoff. On the one hand, the higher the delay in the
market for technology, the longer the time period for which the innovator retains duopoly
profits after the first entry. Furthermore, as we discussed before, a higher value of d2 increases
the equilibrium hazard rate and therefore the duopoly profits and the licensing payments are
obtained earlier. There is nevertheless a powerful offsetting effect: The first entry will occur, on
average, earlier and the innovator will thus obtain monopoly profits for a shorter time period.
Last, we discuss the dynamics of entry and appropriation if d2 ≥ d̂2. In this case, the
equilibrium payoff of the leader becomes larger than the equilibrium payoff of the follower.
Besides, both of these equilibrium payoffs are greater than the equilibrium payoff of simultaneous
entry. This payoff structure gives rise to a preemption game, in which entry into the market
takes place immediately at time t = 0. Formally.
Proposition 6 Let d2 ∈
[
d̂2, d˜2
]
for d̂2 := (1/r) ln (Π2/ (Π2 − κ)). Then
(i) as the length of a period shrinks to zero, ∆ → 0, the unique perfect equilibrium outcome is
39We insist on an important distinction. Note that d2 is the equilibrium delay in the market for technology.
In other words, it is the amount of real time that the second imitator must wait before buying a license at a
zero price. On the other hand, when we refer to “delay to enter the market”, the delay corresponds to the time
elapsed before entry of the first imitator.
40Note that when d2 = 0, we obtain the same results of Proposition 2.
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that entry will happen for sure at time t = 0;
(ii) the innovator sets a price for both licenses equal to κ and her equilibrium payoff is Vs(κ, d2) =
φV es + (1− φ)V as where φ (κ, d2) is the probability of simultaneous entry at t = 0 and
V es := 2κ+Π3; V
a
s :=
[
κ+ (1− e−rd2)Π2 + e−rd2Π3
]
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that the innovator’s equilibrium payoff is a convex combination of the payoff that
she receives when imitators enter the market simultaneously at t = 0 as in Proposition 3, V es ,
and when only one of them enters the market at t = 0 and the other follows after a delay of at
least d̂2, V as . We know, from Proposition 3, that the innovator’s equilibrium payoff for the no-
delay licensing equilibrium, Vs(κ), is strictly higher than V es .Besides, straightfoward calculations
show that Vs(κ) is also strictly higher than V as for all values of d2 ∈
[
d̂2, d˜2
]
.
So, even though ex-post the innovator appropriates with strictly positive probability duopoly
profits, sells two licenses instead of one and receives all these payments earlier, she is still strictly
worse off than if the no-delay licensing equilibrium were played. Entry the product market
happens instantaneously and erodes her monopoly profits substantially.
In our view Propositions 2, 5 and 6 together provide a concise view of appropriation problems
in an economy without intellectual property rights. They reveal that appropriation is closely
linked to the price and the speed at which the second license will be traded in the market
for technology. When imitators expect knowledge to be diffused slowly through the licensing
process, entry into the market will be inevitably fast. Thus we show that if an appropriation
failure exist, it is not caused by a lack of intellectual property rights per se but rather by a
different kind of failure coming from slow diffusion of knowledge in the market for technology.
5. LARGE NUMBER OF IMITATORS
In this section we examine the innovator’s appropriability problem in an economy populated
by a large number of potential imitators. The set of potential imitators is denoted P := {2, 3...}
and the set of active imitators by A := {0, 1, ...}. The present value of equilibrium profits when
there are n active imitators is Πn+1 for n ∈ A.41 The notion that profits decrease as the number
of active rivals increases is formalized by assuming that the sequence of profits (Πn+1)n∈A is
decreasing. Besides, we also suppose that profits are weakly greater than zero.42 Thus, the
sequence (Πn+1)n∈A converges to zero.
In the previous sections, Assumption 1 (Π3 > κ) guaranteed that copying was a valuable
activity for all potential imitators. When the number of potential imitators becomes large, such
an assumption becomes difficult to satisfy. We thus consider two cases. The first case, in the
continuity of the previous sections, assumes that the imitation cost is smaller than the present
value of profits, Πn+1, for all n ∈ P. To allow for this, the imitation cost must also diminish
41Note that n imitators and the innovator share the market and thus we obtain profits Πn+1.
42This assumption corresponds for instance to a case in which there are no fixed costs.
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as the number of active imitators increases. Hence we call this scenario variable imitation cost.
The second case is one where, when n is sufficiently large, the profits Πn+1 are smaller than the
imitation cost.
Independently of the case considered, we show that when the number of potential imitators
becomes sufficiently large, the number of active imitators converges to zero and the innovator’s
equilibrium payoff converges to the present value of monopoly profits.43 This result challenges
the classical arguments calling for intellectual property rights.44
A. Variable Imitation Cost
To maintain the spirit of Assumption 1, we introduce its equivalent for a large economy.
Assumption 2: ∀n ∈ P : (Πn+1 − κn) > 0
Since profits converge to zero as the number of active imitators increases, this assumption
requires that the imitation cost depends on n. Moreover, observe that the sequence of imitation
costs (κn)
∞
n=2 must also converge to zero. It is important to realize that this assumption should
not be interpreted literally. Assumption 2 is rather a modelling device which guarantees that
even for large economies imitation is still profitable for all potential imitators. Note that it
captures well situations where the imitation cost is very small.
We also make an additional assumption that restricts the rate at which the imitation cost
varies with n. Assumption 3 turns out to be important for our main result.
Assumption 3: limn→∞ (Πn+1/κn) = 1
Under these assumptions, if the market for technology is missing, it is a simple extension
of Proposition 1 to show that in a large economy (i.e., as n → ∞) there is a unique SPE in
which: (i) All imitators copy the innovation immediately at time zero and (ii) The innovator’s
equilibrium payoff converges to zero. Thus, as the conventional wisdom suggests, innovation
would never take place without intellectual property rights.
We now turn to the question of appropriability in the presence of a market for technology.
Similar to the no-delay licensing equilibrium of Section 3, we focus on the equilibrium outcome
such that, after the first entry, the innovator and all active imitators immediately offer licenses
to the remaining imitators at a zero price.
Proposition 7 If Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, the unique symmetric MPE is such that:
(i) the innovator sets a price psn = κn for the licenses;
(ii) the distribution of entry times of each imitator is exponential with hazard rate equal to
λn =
r (Πn+1 − κn)
(n− 1)κn
43In this section, in contrast to the previous sections, the assumption that those imitators who enter by copying
can also sell knowledge turns out to be important for our main result.
44The traditional arguments should be particularly relevant in this case with a large number of imitators who
should theoretically reduce the profits of the innovator to zero.
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(iii) as n→∞ the innovator’s equilibrium payoff converges to monopoly profits:
lim
n→∞V
n
s (κn) = Π1
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition fundamentally challenges the received conventional wisdom: It states that
when the number of potential imitators becomes sufficiently large, the innovator will receive an
equilibrium payoff arbitrarily close to monopoly profits.
To give an intuition for this result it is important to first understand the role played by
Assumption 3. Note, on the one hand, that when n → ∞ the equilibrium price of the first
license, κn, converges to zero. So, as n → ∞, the benefits of waiting converge to zero.45 But,
on the other hand, the opportunity cost of waiting (i.e. the profitability of copying (Πn+1 − κn))
also converges to zero, as n → ∞. Assumption 3 guarantees that these two terms decrease at
the same rate and for this reason, in the limit, the following ratio
(Πn+1 − κn)
κn
becomes negligible. Thus as n goes to infinity, the individual hazard rate λn converges to zero.
However, the equilibrium payoff of the innovator depends on the time of the first entry and
thus on the aggregate hazard rate, nλn. Result (iii) establishes that as n → ∞, nλn → 0 and
the innovator’s profits converge to monopoly. Indeed an increase in the number of potential
imitators is compensated by a decrease in the hazard rate of each individual imitator thus
postponing the time of first entry.
The fact that the individual hazard rate λn is divided by n − 1 summarizes an important
message of this paper. Note that the imitator who buys the first license provides a positive
(pecuniary) externality to the rest of the imitators. Indeed the first entrant creates competition
in the market for technology and the rest of the imitators benefit by buying licenses at a
zero price. So, rational imitators anticipating the possibility of receiving these future positive
externalities delay their entry into the market. When the number of imitators becomes large,
the incentives of each individual imitator to buy the first license are decreased, as the pool of
potential first entrants becomes larger.46
B. Fixed Imitation Cost
We consider the second case such that the imitation cost remains fixed at a level κ > 0
independently of n. Therefore for n large enough Assumption 2 is not satisfied and profits
45The benefit of waiting is the difference bewteen the price of the first and the price of the second license.
46More formally, consider an imitator, say imitator i, that must decide whether to wait a period of time equal
to ∆ or buy a license at time t. If he buys it at t, he will be the leader and obtain a payoff equal to V1. However,
if he chooses to buy it at t+∆, he will buy it at a zero price if at least one of the other n− 1 imitators bought
it before him. In a behavior equilibrium, imitator i must be indifferent between buying at time t and buying
at time t + ∆. But when the number of imitators increases, the probability that at least one of them buys a
license before imitator i also increases. So, he will remain indifferent between t and t+∆ if and only if, the other
imitators decrease their corresponding probabilities of buying a license in the time interval ∆.
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become strictly smaller than κ. We denote by K the number of imitators such that ΠK+2 <
κ ≤ ΠK+1. As in the previous case, we focus on the equilibrium such that, after the first entry,
the innovator and all active imitators immediately offer licenses to the remaining imitators at
a zero price. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 8 As δ → 1 and for all n > K, the unique symmetric MPE is such that no imi-
tator initially enters the market and the innovator’s equilibrium payoff equal monopoly profits.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result of Proposition 8 has a flavor similar to the holdup problem. An imitator is willing
to buy the first license by making a sunk payment equal to κ only if he anticipates that his
profits will cover this cost. He will thus buy the first license if and only if he anticipates that
at most K − 1 other imitators will also enter the market. But, after he enters, intense rivalry
in the market for technology leads to an entrance of n− 1 > K − 1 imitators as they pay a zero
price for the second license. Thus entry can never be initially profitable and the innovator will
retain monopoly rents forever.47
6. RELATED LITERATURE
Our results are related to several branches of the literature. First, our paper is connected
with a literature that argues in favor of weakening intellectual property rights. In a sequence
of papers, Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2004, 2005, 2007) have proposed a new model of creative
activity under perfect competition. These papers share the essential idea that innovative rents
equal the discounted value of the revenue stream generated by the first unit(s) of the proto-
type(s) created by the inventor. We emphasize in our paper a different mechanism based on
the dynamics of the market for technology. Our purpose is to depart in a minimal way from the
conventional model. Indeed we only introduce the market for licenses. Our work complements
theses papers by showing the existence of a different source of rents in the absence of intellectual
property rights.48
Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) study the consequences of introducing independent invention
defence in the patent system.49 In their paper, the inventor can always find suitable fixed-fee and
royalty licensing contracts to deter the duplication of R&D costs by independent inventors.50
They show that if the cost of independent invention is more than half the initial research cost,
the innovator can deter duplication through licensing and still recover her R&D cost. As our
47These results are closely linked to Boldrin and Levine (2008). The authors argue that if competition on the
product market is severe enough and there is a fixed cost of imitation (equivalent to the cost κ in our paper)
imitators might refrain from initially entering. The environment they consider does not include a market for
technology, but has the inventor moving first and choosing quantities before the imitators. She can therefore
choose to produce more than the monopoly quantity, to decrease prices and thus discourage imitation.
48As pointed out in section 5, the results for a large number of imitators are also linked to Boldrin and Levine
(2008).
49Under independent invention defence, independent inventors (imitators who reverse engineer the product)
are allowed to share the market with the innovator.
50These contracts decrease profits on the market.
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work, this paper emphasizes the importance of the market for technology for the innovator’s
rents but our approach and results differ on several accounts. First, whereas the analysis in
Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) is static, our model is built to capture the dynamic trading
relationships that exist between innovators and imitators in the market for technology. Second,
we emphasize the important of non-exclusive contracts as a commitment device. Third, we find
that even for small reverse engineering costs, the inventor can appropriate large rents due to the
dynamics of the market.51 Note however that a cautious reinterpretation of our model in the
spirit of their paper suggests that our findings also argue in favour of an independent invention
defence.
The use of licensing to preserve monopoly rents has also been of interest in the literature.
Gallini (1984) shows that an incumbent could license her innovation to eliminate the incentives
of a rival to develop his own superior technology. Rockett (1990) shows how an innovator can
use licensing to crowd out the market by weak competitors and thus to prevent entry of strong
rivals. Although our paper relates to this literature there are clear differences. In particular, in
our setting imitators are homogeneous and the innovator deters entry through a subtle use of
non-exclusive licensing contracts.
Other explanations for the existence of endogenous delay in imitation have also been pro-
posed. Scherer (1980) suggests that technological constraints generates “natural lags” in imita-
tion. This explanation does not depend on the strategic responses of imitators. Benoit (1985)
shows how an endogenous delay can emerge if the profitability of a non-patentable innovation
is uncertain and gradually revealed over time to a unique imitator. We do not introduce asym-
metric information but rather build on the strategic interactions between several imitators in
the market for technology.
Choi (1998) is closest to our paper in that the effect of imitation on the innovator is obtained
through endogenous entry that results from strategic interaction between imitators. However,
in his paper imitation occurs in a world with imperfect patent rights and the interaction be-
tween imitators is controlled by information transmission through possible infringement suits.
In contrast, our paper focuses on a setting without patent rights and in which the strategic
interaction is dominated by the dynamics of the price of licenses. For instance, the main results
of Choi (1998) are driven by an informational externality : If an imitator enters the market and
the innovator responds with an infringement suit, the second imitator will receive information
concerning the outcome of that suit. In contrast, our results are mainly driven by a pecuniary
externality : After the first imitator enters the market, the equilibrium price of the second license
will fall to its marginal cost.52
A paper by Arora and Fosfuri (2003) focuses on the interaction between the product market
and the market for technology in a static environment. The paper highlights that it can be
51The cost of research of the inventor is not explicitely defined in our model. But a similar comparison between
the rents of the inventor and the cost κ of reverse engineering is performed in section 3.
52We note that also Bernheim (1984) examines the dynamics of entry deterrence. The dynamics are however
very different than in our model. In particular, Bernheim (1984) assumes that entrants are ordered in an
exogenously given sequence.
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optimal for a firm to license out its technology to a rival. In a static model, it proves that,
under certain conditions, the revenues that the firm expects from licensing to a rival dominates
the loss due to the erosion of overall industry profits. This paper shares some similarities with
the analysis of what we have called the competitive subgame. More precisely, the trade-off
considered in this paper is comparable to the one that guarantees uniqueness of the no-delay
licensing equilibrium in the competitive subgame.53
Last, as pointed out in the introduction, licensing without intellectual property rights can
be a subtle issue in the presence of asymmetric information. Anton and Yao (1994, 2002) have
underlined this concern. For instance, Anton and Yao (1994) study the problem of an inventor
who can license her idea to two firms. Buyers are reluctant to buy before learning the quality
of the idea but if the idea were revealed, they could potentially steal it. Anton and Yao (1994)
propose a subtle solution to this expropriation problem.54 In the environment that we consider,
asymmetries of information should be minimal and the concerns studied by Anton and Yao
(1994, 2002) can be left aside. Indeed, the innovation is already commercialized at the start of
the game and its success is publicly observable.
7. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a concise view of appropriability problems
in an economy without intellectual property rights but with markets for technology. The results
of this paper reveal that the set of markets in which innovators and imitators interact is crucial
to understand how the rents generated by the arrival of new technologies are divided between
economic agents.
In the absence of a market for licenses, our model can be seen as a simple theoretical
foundation for the received conventional wisdom. However once we allow for simple trading
interactions between innovators and imitators, new and surprising insights are obtained. In
general, the introduction of markets for technology dissipates the appropriability problem. The
innovator collects monopoly profits, at least temporarily, in most of the cases that we have
focused on. The counterpart of this result is that each imitator delays his entry on the market
with the hope that his rival will enter before him. To generate this delay, the innovator optimally
chooses to grant non-exclusive licensing contracts. Indeed, non-exclusivity is crucial to change
the structure of the market for technology (from monopoly to duopoly) and thus to create the
beneficial competition that results in the reduction of the price of the second license.
In Section 4 we highlighted cases where the appropriability problem might reemerge and
these results are suggestive. They show that if an appropriation failure exists, it is not caused
by a lack of intellectual property rights per se but rather by a “coordination” problem related to
how quickly knowledge is diffused in the market for technology. The message of this paper can be
53See in particular the condition in Proposition 4.
54The mechanism that solves this problem starts with full revelation by the inventor. The buyer will still sign
a contract under the threat by the inventor that she will reveal the idea to the competitor if he decided to copy
without paying. Anton and Yao (2002) also discuss a different mechanism for this problem based on partial
disclosure of the idea and the issuance of a bond.
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reexpressed as follows: When knowledge is quickly diffused after the first entry appropriability
concerns are generally dissipated.
Because we have examined appropriability problems, we formulated a very simple and suit-
able model for this particular goal. Thus, we have not considered several interesting issues
which could be the object of future research. First, our model does not consider the possibility
of sequential improvements to the current innovation. In this context, licensing may provide
not only knowledge to imitate the current innovation but also to discover a future improvement.
Second, we have assumed that the imitation cost is common knowledge. In an extension of this
paper, it would be interesting to presume that imitators have private information about their
cost of copying and to examine how this private information affects the innovator’s equilibrium
payoff. Third, our model considers an stationary environment in which market demand is im-
plicitly the same over time. Examining a framework in which market demand changes over
time (i.e. a growing market size) would also be an interesting exercise.
We show that even in the absence of intellectual property rights and in an environment
sufficiently close to the traditional one, inventors are able to collect substantial economic rents.
An essential future step will be to answer the following question: Without intellectual property
rights, do innovators appropriate an equilibrium payoff equal to the social value of their contri-
bution (see Ostroy and Makowski (1995))? Recently, Shapiro (2007) has argued that under the
current patent system innovators capture private rewards that exceed their social contributions.
Could the dynamics of prices in the market for technology appropriately tailor these rents to
their social contributions?
We conclude by offering a different perspective on our results. Two very influential surveys
(Yale Survey (1983) and Carnegie Mellon Survey (1994)) have asked managers to rank the most
efficient means of protecting their innovations. The Yale Survey, conducted in 1983, reports
that for both product and process innovations, secrecy was consistently ranked as one of the
worst methods to protect an innovation. The Carnegie Mellon Survey, conducted ten years
later, reports, on the contrary, that secrecy was consistently ranked first. As Cohen et al (2000)
point out, there is no apparent explanation for the “growth in the importance of secrecy as an
appropriability mechanism”. This fact is particularly surprising, since the period between 1983
and 1994 was one where patent protection tended to strengthen.
Number of industries ranking secrecy as:
Mechanism 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Secrecy 1983 (process) 2 10 19 2
Secrecy 1994 (process) 21 10 1 1
Secrecy 1983 (product) 0 0 11 22
Secrecy 1994 (product) 13 11 2 5
We believe that the mechanism highlighted in this paper offers a potential explanation for
the previous puzzle. Indeed, a firm choosing secrecy is not protected against imitation by
competitors. However, as emphasized in this paper, in the presence of a market for technology,
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imitators might delay entry. Thus, more active licensing markets might increase the returns
that firms can expect from choosing secrecy. Licensing activity did indeed intensify in the
period 1983 to 1994. Arora et. al. (2002) using data compiled by the Securities Data Company
report that the total number of disclosed licensing deals during the period 1985 to 1989 was
1130 while for the years 1993 and 1994, 2009 and 2426 deals were signed respectively.55 Our
model can thus reconcile the parallel increase in the popularity of both secrecy and licensing,
providing therefore a novel explanation for this puzzle. This is yet another perspective on our
results.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. A pure strategy for imitator h ∈ {i, j} must prescribe at each
period t whether to “to copy” or “not to copy”. We proceed in steps.
First, we consider the single decision problem that follows a history in which only one
imitator, say imitator j, has copied.
Step1. Suppose that imitator j has chosen “to copy” at period t − 1. Then, the unique
best response of imitator i is “to copy” at period t.
To see that, observe that by copying at any period ti ≥ t he obtains a payoff in period t
units of Vi(ti) = δ(ti−t) (Π3 − κ) and clearly t = argmaxti∈[t,∞) Vi(ti).
Now we turn our attention to those histories that start at period t and in which no imitator
has copied yet. Given the symmetry of the game, we study the best response of imitator i to
the following two strategies of imitator j.
Step 2. Suppose that the strategy of imitator j dictates “to copy” at period t. Then, the
unique best response for imitator i is also “to copy” at period t.
This follows directly because if imitator i chooses “to copy” at period ti ≥ t he receives a
payoff in period t units equal to Vi(ti) = δ(ti−t) (Π3 − κ) and clearly t = argmaxti∈[t,∞) Vi(ti).
Step 3. Suppose that the strategy of imitator j dictates “to copy” at a period tj > t. Then,
the unique best response for imitator i is “to copy” at period t.
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We know, from step 1, that if imitator i copies at ti < tj the strategy of imitator j prescribes
“to copy” at period ti+1 (i.e., ∆ units of real time later). Thus, if imitator i chooses “to copy”
at period t ≤ ti < tj he obtains a payoff in period t units of Vi(t) = δ(ti−t) [(1− δ)Π2 + δΠ3 − κ].
But if he chooses “to copy” at period ti ≥ tj he receives a payoff in period t units of Vi(t) =
δ(ti−t) [Π3 − κ]. Comparing these payoffs, it is evident that the unique best response for imitator
i is “to copy” at period t, without delay.
So, our analysis reveals that there is a unique SPE in which imitators choose “to copy”
immediately at all periods in which copy has not occurred yet. Thus the unique equilibrium
outcome is such that both imitators choose “to copy” at period zero and such that the equilib-
rium payoffs for the inventor and the imitators are Π3 and Π3 − κ respectively.
Lemma 0: Consider the following strategies for the sellers (imitator i and the inventor)
and for imitator j.
pτyj = 0, for y = i, s for all feasible histories if entry has not happened yet and for all τ ≥ t+ 1
σj =

“enter” by ` buying from ŷ if p̂ ≤ min {κ, (1− δ)Π3} , for all τ ≥ t+ 1
“enter” by c if κ ≤ min {p̂, (1− δ)Π3} , for all τ ≥ t+ 1
“wait” or “do not enter” if min {p̂, κ} > (1− δ)Π3 for all τ ≥ t+ 1
where ŷ denotes the identity of the seller who offers the minimum license price and p̂ :=
miny∈{i,s} pyj . Furthermore ` denotes the strategy of buying a license and c of copying.
These strategies constitute a MPE and they give rise to the no-delay licensing equilibrium
outcome.
Proof of Lemma 0. We first note that the strategies described above give rise to the
no-delay licensing equilibrium outcome described in the main text. We now prove that these
strategies form a subgame perfect nash equilibrium. For the sellers it is clear that, given any
history and the strategy of the other players, they do not have strict incentives to deviate
from the actions prescribed by their strategies. As to imitator j, we make the following two
observations. First, note that if he chooses to enter at the present period, he will do it either
by licensing from the seller with lowest license price or by copying the innovation, whatever
alternative is more profitable. Second, if he chooses to enter at the current period rather than
wait one period and buy a license at the next at a zero price it must be that
max {Π3 − p̂,Π3 − κ} ≥ δΠ3
where Π3 − p̂ is the payoff in present units of buying by licensing, Π3 − κ is the payoff in
present units of copying and δΠ3 is the payoff in current units of waiting and buying a license
at a zero price next period. It follows then that imitator j will enter by buying a license if
and only if (iff, henceforth) p̂ ≤ min {κ, (1− δ)Π3}. On the contrary, he will enter by copying
iff κ ≤ min {p̂, (1− δ)Π3}. So, it is easy to see that he will not enter at the current period iff
(1− δ)Π3 > min {p̂, κ}.
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Proof of Lemma 1 As we observed in the main text, the payoff relevant history is de-
termined in our model by the number of imitators who are active in the market at each time
period. Thus, the following partition H := {H0,H1}, where Hn is a set that collects all those
histories for which n = 0, 1 imitators are active in the market, is the minimal (coarsest) sufficient
partition that permit us to define MPE. A strategy for the innovator, σs, is Markovian if it is
measurable with respect to the corresponding partitions. Formally, if the history ĥτ ∈ Hn(h˜τ )
for some n = 0, 1, then the continuation strategy σs|bhτ must equal the continuation strategy
σs|ehτ .
Measurability implies that the inventor’s strategy must prescribe the same pair of prices
psh ∈ R+∪{+∞} for each period τ ≥ t at which entry has not taken place yet. We claim that a
necessary condition for a Markovian licensing strategy, σs, to be optimal is that it should dictate
to sell two licenses at prices psh ≤ κ for h ∈ {i, j}. The idea is simple. Any Markovian strategy
which does not satisfy this necessary condition is weakly dominated by σs and therefore it can
not be optimal. There are at most two of these strategies. One, the inventor sells no licences:
psh = +∞ for h ∈ {i, j}, denoted by σ∞ij . And the other, the inventor sells just one license, say
to imitator i: psj = +∞. We denote this strategy σ∞j .
Notice that when the innovator uses either σ∞ij or σ
∞
j the entry cost of imitator h ∈ {i, j}
in the first case and of imitator j in the second one equals κ. The inventor must therefore be
weakly better off when she uses σs than when she adopts strategy σ∞ij . When she uses σs, she
can always set psh = κ for h ∈ {i, j} and imitators would face the same entry cost as when she
employs σ∞ij . Thus, she will receive at least the same expected market profits by using σs as
when she uses σ∞ij . But she will obtain higher licensing revenues, if entry happens, because it
will take place through licensing. The same argument holds for the case of σ∞j .
Proof of Proposition 2. In this proposition, we determine the unique symmetric MPE
when ∆ goes to zero. We proceed in a number of steps. Because the proof is long, we succinctly
describe each step. In step 1, we show that when the time discount associated with ∆ is
small enough there exists at least a MPE in behavior strategies. In the second step, we derive
sufficient conditions which guarantee uniqueness. In step 3, we obtain the limiting equilibrium
distribution when ∆ → 0. In step 4, we determine the expected payoff of the inventor for a
given pair of licensing prices psi and psj . Finally, in step 5, we show that the optimal license
prices are psi = psj = κ.
Step 1. If δ ≥ δE := [Π2 − κ] /Π2 and if min {psi, psj} ∈ (pE , κ] (for pE :=
(
1− δE
)
Π2)
then a MPE in behavior strategies exists.
Notice that if min {psi, psj} > pE then V 2h − V 1h > 0 for h ∈ {i, j} and our game is a
“war of attrition”. The weak inequality δ ≥ δE guarantees that pE ≤ κ. Define Q(ψj) :=
ψjV
b
i + (1 − ψj)V 1i as the value for imitator j of buying a license in the current period and
W (ψj) := ψjV 2i + (1 − ψj)δQ(ψj) as the value for imitator j of buying a license in the next
period. Then, Wi (ψj) :=W (ψj)−Q (ψj) and note that
Wi (ψj) = ψj
[
V 2i − V bi
]
+ (1− ψj)
[
δQ(ψj)− V 1i
]
= 0 (A1)
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describes the equilibrium condition for imitator i to be indifferent between buying a license at
period t or buying it ∆ extra units of time later. We show that Wi (ψj) = 0 has at least one
solution ψ∗j ∈ (0, 1). To see this, observe that Wi (0) = δQ(0)− V 1i = −V 1i (1− δ) < 0. By the
continuity ofWi in ψj ,Wi (ψj) = 0 has at least one solution ψ∗j ∈ (0, 1) iffWi (1) =
[
V 2i − V bi
]
=
psi − Π3 (1− δ) > 0 ⇐⇒ psi > (1− δ)Π3. But by assumption psi > pE >
(
1− δE
)
Π3 and
hence Wi (1) > 0. So Wi (ψj) = 0 has at least one solution. By symmetry Wj (ψi) = 0 also has
at least one solution.
Step 2. Suppose that δ ≥ max{δE , δU} and that min {psi, psj} ∈ (pU , κ], then there exists
a unique MPE in behavior strategies; where
δU :=
−α+
√
α2 − 8β2
4β
, pU :=
β (1− δ) (2δ − 1)
δ
and β := Π2 −Π3; α := (κ− 3β).
To demonstrate uniqueness, it suffices to show that Wi (ψj) is strictly increasing in the unit
interval. Because Wi (ψj) and Q(ψj) are C1 functions, we have
Wji (ψj) :=
dWi (ψj)
dψj
=
[
V 2i − V bi
]
− [δQ(ψj)− V 1i ]+ (1− ψj)δ dQ(ψj)dψj
Then, using the definition of Q(ψj), we have that Wji (ψj) = (V 2i − V bi ) + V 1i (1− δ) + δ(V 1i −
V bi )(2ψj−1). So a sufficient condition forWi (ψj) to be strictly increasing in the unit interval is
thatWji (0) = (V 2i −V bi )+V 1i (1− δ)− δ(V 1i −V bi ) = β (1− δ) (1−2δ)+ δpsi > 0; where the last
equality comes from using our derivations in the main text for V 1i , V
2
i and V
b
i . Therefore the
condition psi ≥ pU is sufficient for uniqueness.56 So, the only remaining step is to prove that
pU ≤ κ. The condition pU ≤ κ is equivalent to Z(δ) := 2βδ2+αδ+β > 0; where α := (κ− 3β).
Then, recall that δU is equal to
δU :=
−α+
√
α2 − 8β2
4β
and notice that δU is the largest solution to the quadratic equation Z(δ) = 0. It therefore
follows that: (i) δU < 1, given that when δ = 1, Z(δ) = κ > 0; and (ii) ∀δ > δU : Z(δ) > 0,
given that Z(δ) is a strictly convex function of δ. So δ > δU guarantees that pU ≤ κ.57
Thus the conditions specified in this step ensure that there is a unique solution to the
equation Wi (ψj) = 0. By symmetry, the same arguments apply to imitator j. Finally, we
conclude by obtaining an explicit solution for ψ∗h for h ∈ {i, j}. Observe that Wi(ψ∗j ) = 0 can
be rearranged as follows
Wi(ψ∗j ) := aψ2j + bψj + c = 0 (A2)
56Because if pU ≤ pE existence would imply uniqueness and step 1 would be enough.
57Note that we consider the case in which α ≤ 0. The situation in which α > 0 is easy to handle. Because
β > 0, Z(δ) is an strictly increasing function of δ and Z(0) = β > 0. Thus, when α > 0, our claim follows
directly.
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where a := δ
(
V 1i − V bi
)
= β(1 − δ) > 0; b := (V 2i − V bi ) + δ (V bi − V 1i ) + (1 − δ)V 1i > 0 and
finally c := −(1− δ)V 1i < 0.58 Recalling that a, b and c are functions of ∆, the unique solution
to equation (A2) can be written as
ψ∗j (∆) =
−b+√b2 − 4ac
2a
(A3)
By symmetry we can derive an analogous result for imitator i.
Step 3. When ∆ goes to zero the limiting distribution of entry times for each imitator is
exponentially distributed with hazard rate λi = r (Π3 − psj) /psj and λj = r (Π3 − psi) /psi.
We prove this result for imitator j. Note that as ∆ goes to zero, δ converges to 1 and
therefore the conditions on the parameter δ imposed in steps 1 and 2 guaranteeing existence
and uniqueness are indeed satisfied.
As ∆→ 0 our interest resides in obtaining the hazard rate of the distribution of entry times
for the imitators. Therefore, at period t, conditional on no imitator having entered into the
market yet, we are interested in examining whether the following limit
lim
∆↓0
Pr {t < tj ≤ t+∆|tj ≥ t}
∆
= lim
∆↓0
ψ∗j (∆)
∆
exists; where tj is the entry time for imitator j. We can rewrite ψ∗j as
ψ∗j =
(
−b+√b2 − 4ac
)(
b+
√
b2 − 4ac
)
2a
× 1
b+
√
b2 − 4ac =
u(∆)
v(∆)
where u(∆) := −2c and v(∆) := b + √b2 − 4ac. As ∆ → 0 we have that δ → 1, a → 0,
b → psi and c → 0. Using these results, we obtain that lim∆↓0 u = 0 and lim∆↓0 v = 2psi.
Overall lim∆↓0 ψ∗j = 0 and lim∆↓0
ψ∗j (∆)
∆ = lim∆↓0
∂ψ∗j
∂∆ = lim∆↓0
(
u′v−uv′
v2
)
. Because u′(0) =
2r (Π3 − psi) and v′(0) = −2r (β + psi) we have that
λj := lim
∆↓0
ψ∗j (∆)
∆
=
u′(0)
v(0)
=
r (Π3 − psi)
psi
Recall that a distribution has a constant hazard rate if and only if it is an exponential distribu-
tion (See, for example, Proposition B.2, page 297, Marshall and Olkin). Thus, the cumulative
distribution function of entry times for imitator j is Gj(t) = 1− e−λjt, t ≥ 0. By a symmetric
argument it is straightforward to determine the limiting distribution of entry times for imitator
i.
Step 4: The inventor’s discounted expected payoff is: Vs(psi, psj) = pi1r+λi+λj +
(λi+λj)Π3
r+λi+λj
+
λipsi+λjpsj
r+λi+λj
.
The expected payoff of the innovator depends on the time of the first entry, t1, a random
variable that takes values in [0,∞). By definition t1 := min {ti, tj}. Also it is a well-known fact
that because ti and tj are independent random variables with hazard rates equal to λi and λj ,
58We drop the symbol ∗ just for convenience.
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t1 has a hazard rate equal to λi+λj . Now suppose t1 = t ∈ [0,∞). Because the second imitator
enters instantaneously at time t, the inventor obtains: (i) A flow of monopoly profits pi1 up to
time t; (ii) A flow of triopoly profits pi3 from time t on; and (iii) At time t, she receives either
psi or psj depending on the identity of the first imitator. So, her expected payoff is
Vs(pi, pj ; t) =
pi1
r
[
1− e−rt]+ e−rtΠ3 + e−rt [ λi
λi + λj
psi +
λj
λi + λj
psj
]
where the last term follows from the definition of hazard rates. Because ti and tj are exponen-
tially distributed random variables, t1 is also exponentially distributed with parameter λi+λj .59
Hence, the inventor’s discounted expected payoff is
Vs(psi, psj) =
pi1
r + λi + λj
+
λi + λj
r + λi + λj
Π3 +
λipsi + λjpsj
r + λi + λj
Step 5. The payoff maximizing licensing prices are p∗si = p
∗
sj = κ.
The goal of the inventor is to choose a pair of prices {psi, psj} in order to maximize
Vs(psi, psj). The derivative of Vs(psi, psj) with respect to psi is
∂Vs
∂psi
:= V is =
λi
D
− 1
D2
∂λj
∂psi
[pi1 − pi3 − psjr − psjλi + λipsi]
where D := (r + λi + λj). Using, from step 3, the result for λi we have that V is reduces to:
V is =
λi
D − 1D2
∂λj
∂psi
[pi1 − 2pi3 + λipsi]. And because, we know from step 3, that ∂λj/∂psi < 0, it
follows that, for all values of psj , Vs(psi, psj) is strictly increasing in psi since pi1 > 2pi3 for all
market games that we consider. By symmetry, Vs(psi, psj) is strictly increasing in psj for all
values of psi. Thus the optimal pair of prices are p∗si = p
∗
sj = κ.
To conclude: Result (i) is a direct consequence of step 5; result (ii) is step 3 for the optimal
license prices p∗si = p
∗
sj = κ; and finally result (iii) is step 4 for p
∗
si = p
∗
sj = κ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Because we concentrate in SPE, the strategy for the inventor dictates,
at the beginning of each period τ ≥ t + 1, the price at which she offers a license to imitator
j : pτsj ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞} for every feasible history. On the other hand, the strategy for imitator
j orders for each period τ ≥ t + 1 and every feasible history whether “to enter” or not, and
conditional on entrance, his mode of entry.
Note that any SPE in pure strategies must satisfy the following two properties:
Property 1 (Copy never occurs): Imitator j enters the market by purchasing a license at
a price of κ.
As in lemma 0, the innovator always prefers to offer a license at a price psi = κ rather than
offer no license: she can at least obtain licensing revenues. Furthermore, if a license is sold, it
will always be sold at a price of κ. If not there would be a profitable deviation for the innovator.
Property 2 (No Delay): Imitator j immediately buys a license.
59See, for instance, Proposition C.1, page 302, Marshall and Olkin
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By property 1 we know that imitator j will never copy in equilibrium. Thus, when a license
is offered at period τ he can either accept the current offer or reject it and then accept a future
license offer. Rejecting a current offer would be a best response if imitator j obtained a higher
payoff by accepting a future offer. However this is clearly impossible according to property 1.
Formally, the following pair of strategies form the unique SPE
psj = κ always
σj =
{
“enter” by ` if psj ≤ κ
“enter” by c if if psj > κ
in which imitator j enters immediately at t+ 1 by buying a licensing at a price equal to κ.
Proof of Proposition 3. We consider all feasible subgames that start at the beginning of
period t at which neither imitator has entered the market yet. The inventor announces, at the
beginning of each period τ ≥ t, for each feasible history a pair of license prices
{
pτsi, p
τ
sj
}
. The
imitators, at each period τ ≥ t, and for each feasible history, simultaneously decide whether “to
enter” or not and, conditional on entrance, how to enter. The proof is similar to that of lemma
2. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We observe that any SPE must satisfy the following three properties:
Property 1 (Copy never occurs): The imitators enter the market by purchasing a license.
The argument follows similar lines to those of the previous lemma.
Property 2 (Simultaneous Entry): The imitators enter the market at the same period.
To see this, suppose it were not. Then one of the imitators, say imitator i, must enter
the market at period τ ≥ t and imitator j at period τ̂ > τ . By lemma 2, we know that in
equilibrium τ̂ = τ + 1 and the imitator j’s equilibrium payoff in period τ units is δ (Π3 − κ).
However, if imitator j deviates and buys a license at period τ his worst payoff would be Π3− κ
which is strictly higher than δ (Π3 − κ). Thus, the conclusion follows.
Property 3 (No Delay): Whenever the innovator offers a license, her equilibrium offer will
be simultaneously accepted by the imitators.
We know that copying will never take place and that entry will occur simultaneously. If the
imitators reject the current offer and enter the market in a future period they will be strictly
worse off because at any period at which the licenses are traded their price will be equal to κ.
Properties 1, 2 and 3 together imply that, for any history at which the imitators have
not entered the market yet, the licenses will be traded immediately. Then, the unique best
response for the innovator is to offer at every period and for every feasible history the same
pair of equilibrium license prices,
{
pτsi, p
τ
sj
}
= {κ, κ} for all τ ≥ t+ 1. Moreover, the following
pair of strategies conform the unique SPE
{
pτsi, p
τ
sj
}
= {κ, κ} always
σh =
{
“enter” by ` if psh ≤ κ
“enter” by c if if psh > κ
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So, in the unique SPE both imitators will enter at period t = 0 and the inventor’s discounted
equilibrium payoff is Π3 + 2κ.
Step 2. In the case of exclusive contracts the innovator’s discounted equilibrium payoff
is V es = Π3 + 2κ; and in the case of non-exclusive contracts, according to proposition 2 is
Vs = pi1r+2λ+
2λ
r+2λ (Π3 + κ). To compare them we define υ :=
[
pi1
r+2λ +
2λ
r+2λ (Π3 + κ)
]
−[Π3 + 2κ].
Our goal is to show υ ≥ 0. We have that υ ≥ 0 if and only if pi1 − pi3 ≥ 2κ(r + λ). Given
that λ = r (Π3 − κ) /κ, it follows that υ ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ pi1 − 3pi3 ≥ 0. This last inequality is always
strictly satisfied for all market games considered in this paper. Hence, we conclude that it is
strictly preferable for the innovator to offer non-exclusive contracts.
Proof of Proposition 4. We show the validity of this proposition sequentially.
Step 1. After the first imitator, say imitator i, enters the market at time t imitator j must
enter the market at some finite time τ ≥ t.
To see this, suppose it were not. This is impossible because by copying at time t imitator j
guarantees himself a payoff in time t units equal to Vj = Π3 − κ > 0.
Step 2. In any SPE entry must occur through licensing. Moreover, the price of the license
at any τ ≥ t at which entry happens must be equal to zero.
This follows the logic of previous proofs.
Step 3. For any d2 ∈
[
0, d˜2
]
there exists a SPE whose outcome is for imitator j to enter
the market at time t2 = t+ d2 by buying a license at a zero price iff 2Π3 ≤ Π2.
To prove this statement, note that the following strategies support the SPE outcome de-
scribed above.60 In particular, for the sellers (the inventor and imitator i)
σs = σi =
{
pj = κ for all τ− such that t ≤ τ− < t2
pj = 0 for all τ+ such that τ+ ≥ t2
And for the buyer (imitator j)
σj =

“enter” by ` buying from ŷ if p̂ ≤ pj = Π3(1− e−r(t2−tj)), for τ− such that t ≤ τ− < t2
“wait” if p̂ > pj = Π3(1− e−r(τ−tj)), for τ− such that t ≤ τ− < t2
“enter” by ` buying from ŷ if p̂ ≤ min {κ, (1− δ)Π3} , for all τ+ ≥ t2
“enter” by c if κ ≤ min {p̂, (1− δ)Π3} , for all τ+ ≥ t2
“wait” or “do not enter” if min {p̂, κ} > (1− δ)Π3 for all τ+ ≥ t2
where tj ∈ [τ−, t2) is the time at which one of the sellers offers a license to imitator j, ŷ denotes
the identity of the seller who offers the minimum license price and p̂ := miny∈{i,s} pyj
Now we show that for any d2 ∈
[
0, d˜2
]
these strategies form a SPE. First, note that by
definition of d˜2 imitator j does not have any incentive to deviate and choose “to enter” by
copying at any time τ− such that t ≤ τ− < t2. Second, suppose that a license is offered at
a price p̂ at time tj ∈ [τ−, t2). If he accepted the offer, he would obtain a payoff in time
60The strategies should be interpreted as prescribing actions at nodes in the limiting case when ∆→ 0
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tj units of Π3 − p̂. If he instead rejected it, he would receive a payoff in time tj units of
e−r(t2−tj)Π3. Thus, his best response is to accept the offer and enter the market iff p̂ ∈
[
0, pj
]
where pj = Π3(1− e−r(t2−tj)).
Consider the strategy of the sellers and a time t2 = t + d2. For d2 = 0, the proof is done
in Lemma 0. Hence, let d2 be such that 0 < d2 ≤ d˜2. Then a seller, say imitator i, might
deviate from the proposed strategy and offer a license at time tj for tj ∈ [τ−, τ). From the
buyer’s strategy, the maximum price he can charge is pj . Imitator i will not find profitable to
deviate at time tj if Π3+ pj ≤ Π2
[
1− e−r(t2−tj)]+ e−r(t2−tj)Π3. That is if 2Π3 ≤ Π2. We have
therefore shown the first part of the proposition.
To show the uniqueness result of the second part of the proposition, suppose that 2Π3 > Π2
and that a license is sold at time t2 > t. According to step 2, the equilibrium license price must
be zero. Besides we know that for any tj ∈ [τ−, t2) imitator j will accept to pay at most pj for
a license. But because 2Π3 > Π2 offering a license at a price pj is a profitable deviation for the
sellers. Because our argument is valid for any value of t2 > t it follows that the unique SPE,
when 2Π3 > Π2, is the no-delay equilibrium.
Finally, note that the strategies of the sellers and of imitator j for all time periods τ+ ≥ t2
are identical to the strategy used in the proof of Lemma 0. Hence, the proof is concluded.
Proof of Proposition 5. We denote by G(t) : [0,∞) → [0, 1] the distribution function
of entry times for the imitators. We assume momentarily that G(t) has a density denoted by
g(t) and, to simplify, we also suppose that the innovator does not price discriminate between
the imitators. The proof is in a number of steps.
Step 1. Imitators may delay their entry into the market only if d2 ∈
[
0, d̂2
)
for d̂2 =
(1/r) ln(Π2/Π2 − κ) < d˜2.
To see this, note that V2 = V1 when ps = (1 − e−rd2)Π2. Substituting d̂2 in this last
expression yields ps = (1 − e−r bd2)Π2 = κ. So, for all d2 ∈ [0, d̂2) the inventor might choose a
license price, ps, that satisfies (1− e−rd2)Π2 < ps ≤ κ and hence V2 > V1. Thus depending on
ps delay to buy the first license may occur.
Step 2. We obtain the distribution function of entry times assuming that V2 > V1.
To accomplish this, recall that because we focus on a behavior SPE equilibrium, at time t,
if entry has not happened yet, imitators must be indifferent between: (i) Choosing “to enter”
at time t; and (ii) Waiting dt extra units of time before entering. This indifference condition
requires that the opportunity cost of waiting dt units of extra time be exactly equal to the
expected marginal benefit of waiting dt units of extra time. The opportunity cost is the flow of
profits that an imitator would obtain if he were the leader imitator at t. That is MC = rV1dt.
The marginal benefit is the increase in the payoff that an imitator receives by being the follower
rather than the leader imitator. That is MB(dt) = V2 − V1. However, the marginal benefit is
only received if the rival imitator enters first: an event that is determined by the hazard rate
λ (t) ≡ (g(t)/1−G(t)). So, in a SPE it must be that λ (t) (V2 − V1) = rV1dt. Using equation
(9) of the main text we obtain that for a d2 ∈
[
0, d̂2
)
equilibrium entry times are characterized
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by a constant hazard rate (and thus by an exponential distribution) given by
λ(ps) =
r
[
(1− e−rd2)Π2 + e−rd2Π3 − ps
]
[ps − (1− e−rd2)Π2]
Step 3. We calculate the equilibrium expected payoff for the inventor and show that p∗s = κ.
Like in the proof of proposition 2, assume that the time of the first entry occurred at
t ∈ [0,∞). Since now the follower imitator enters the market with a delay equal to d2 (i.e.,
he enters at time t2), the inventor obtains: (i) A flow of monopoly profits up to time t; (ii)
At time t, she receives the price for the license ps; (iii) A flow of duopoly profits from time t
up to time t2; and finally: (iv) A flow of triopoly profits from time t2 on. Hence, her payoff
is Vs(t, ps, d2) = pi1r
[
1− e−rt] + e−rt [p+ (1− e−rd2)Π2 + e−rd2Π3]. But because the time of
the first entry t1 := min {ti, tj} has an exponential distribution with parameter 2λ it follows
immediately that her expected payoff is
Vs(p, d2) =
pi1
(r + 2λ)
+
2λ
(r + 2λ)
[
ps +
(
1− e−rd2
)
Π2 + e−rd2Π3
]
To conclude this step it suffices to show that the optimal price chosen by the inventor is equal
to κ. If that were the case, note that for all dτ ∈ [0, duτ ) : V2 > V1 and the assumption made in
step 2 would be satisfied. To accomplish this, observe that the innovator chooses a price, p, to
maximize Vs(p, dτ ) subject to the hazard rate found in step 2. Thus
dVs(p, d2)
dps
= − 2r
[r + 2λ(ps)]
2
dλ
dps
(Π1 −M) + 2λ(r + 2λ)
where M := [p+Π2 − e−rd2 (Π2 −Π3)]. Since: (i) dλ/dps < 0; (ii) argminps∈(0,κ](Π1 −M) =
κ; and (iii) The least upper bound of κ is Π3, it is evident that infκ (Π1 −M) = Π1−Π3+Π2+
e−rd2 (Π2 −Π3) > 0. So, because dVs(κ; d2)/dps > 0 the inventor must indeed choose p∗s = κ
and her equilibrium payoff is obtained by replacing p∗s into Vs(p; d2).
Proof of Proposition 6. It is well-known (See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole [?])
that, for preemption games, the limiting distribution of discrete-time games (i.e., when ∆ goes
to zero) may not usually be expressed as an equilibrium in continuous time strategies of the
kind we have used in proposition 5. Because of this limitation, we use our discrete time model
and then we compute the limiting distribution of the equilibrium outcomes.
Step 1. We obtain for our discrete time model the unique symmetric SPE in behavior
strategies.61
The equilibrium condition is W (ψ) = ψ [V2 − Vb] + (1 − ψ) [δQ(ψ)− V1] = 0, for Q(ψ) =
ψVb + (1− ψ)V1. This quadratic equation has two roots
ψ =
−b±√b2 − 4ac
2a
61Recall that the inventor sets the same price for both licenses.
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where a := δ (V1 − Vb) > 0; b := (V2 − δV1) + (1 − δ)) (V1 − Vb); and c := −(1 − δ)V1 < 0.
Because δ is a function of ∆, it follows that as ∆ goes to zero, ψ converges to − (V2 − V1) ±
(V2 − V1) / [2 (V1 − Vb)]. Naturally, we consider the solution corresponding to the positive root
ψτ = (V1 − V2) / (V1 − Vb). By definition of V1, V2 according to equation (9) and given that
Vb = Π3 − p we have that
ψ =
(
1− e−rd2)Π2 − ps
(1− e−rd2) (Π2 −Π3)
Observe that ψ < 1 iff V2 > Vb. But because we consider all those values for dτ ∈
[
d̂2, d˜2
]
, it
follows that V2 > Vb iff ps satisfies κ (Π3/Π2) < ps ≤ κ. Thus, at each period, each imitator
plans to enter the market independently with probability equal to ψ conditional on no having
entered before.
Step 2. Assuming that V2 > Vb, we establish the limiting distribution of entry times when
∆ goes to zero.
Fix any real time t > 0 and observe that the probability that no imitator will have entered
by time t is approximately equal to (1 − ψτ )n(t,∆) where n(t,∆) := (2t) /∆ is the number of
decision nodes between time 0 and time t when the real time length of a period is ∆. As ∆ goes
to zero, n(t,∆) increases without bound and hence this probability also converges to zero. The
conclusion is, therefore, that at least an imitator will enter the market for sure at time t = 0.
Next, we obtain the probability of simultaneous entry at time t = 0. For that, consider that
we must compute the probability of simultaneous entry conditional on the information that
the event in which no imitator enters the market has zero probability. Because both imitators
entering simultaneously has probability ψ2, it is direct to conclude that the probability of
simultaneous entry at time t = 0 is φ (ps, d2) = ψ/ (2− ψ) and therefore the inventor’s expected
payoff is
Vs(p, d2) = φ (ps, d2) [2p+Π3] + [1− φ (ps, d2)]
[
p+
(
1− e−rd2
)
Π2 + e−rd2Π3
]
Step 3. The optimal price is p∗s = κ.
The proof follows similar lines to the preceding ones. Observe that ∂Vs(p, d2)/∂ps =
(∂φ/∂ps)ω(ps) + (1 + φ), where ω (ps, d2) :=
[
ps −
(
1− e−rd2) (Π2 −Π3)]. Then it is straight-
forward to show that
∂φ
∂ps
=
2
(2− ψ)2
∂ψ (ps, d2)
∂ps
=
2
(2− ψ)2
(
− 1
(Π2 −Π3) [1− e−rd2 ]
)
and that (1 + φ) = 2/ (2− ψ). Straightforward mathematical manipulations show that
∂Vs(ps, d2)
∂ps
> 0 ⇐⇒ − ω (ps, d2)
(Π2 −Π3) [1− e−rd2 ] + (2− ψ) > 0
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And after replacing ψ and υ (ps, dτ ) by their values, we finally obtain
∂Vs(ps, d2)
∂ps
> 0 ⇐⇒ 2
(
1− e−rd2
)
(Π2 −Π3)−
(
1− e−rd2
)
Π3 > 0
It is evident that because 2pi2 > 3pi3 : ∂Vs(ps, d2)/∂ps > 0 for all κ (Π3/Π2) < ps ≤ κ and the
optimal price is p∗s = κ validating our assumption that V2 > Vb. The equilibrium payoff for the
inventor is directly computed by replacing p∗s in Vs(ps, d2).
Proof of Proposition 7. We assume that there are n potential imitators, that time is
continuous and, to simplify the exposition, we also suppose that the innovator does not price
discriminate between the imitators. The proof follows a number of steps.
Step 1. After the first entry, there is a perfect equilibrium in which n− 1 licenses are sold
at a zero price to the remaining imitators.
The argument is exactly the same as that of Lemma 0 adapted to the case of n potential
imitators. This implies that the payoff, in period t units, for the leader and the follower imitator
are respectively V1 = Πn+1 − psn and V2 = Πn+1.
Step 2. A necessary condition for a perfect equilibrium in behavior strategy to exist is
W (ψ) :=W − V1 = 0
where W := e−r∆
{
(1− ψn)n−1 V1 +
[
1− (1− ψn)n−1
]
V2
}
.
To establish this, we first note that each imitator must be indifferent between: (i) Entering
by buying a license at real time t; and: (ii) Entering by buying a license at real time t + ∆.
Conditional on no imitator having entered up to time t, if one of them enters immediately at
time t he will obtain a payoff in time t units equal to
V1 = Πn+1 − psn
However, if he decides to enter at time t+∆ he will obtain: (i) A payoff equal to V2 if at least
one of the other n− 1 imitators have entered in the interval of time ∆; and: (ii) A payoff equal
to V1 if none of the other n− 1 imitators have entered in the interval of time ∆. So by entering
at time t+∆ he will obtain a payoff in time t units equal to
W = e−r∆
{
[1− ψn]n−1 V1 +
[
1− [1− ψn]n−1
]
V2
}
where ψn is the probability for each imitator of entering in the interval of time ∆, conditional
on not having entered before real time t. That is
ψn := Pr {t < th ≤ t+∆|th > t}
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In a perfect equilibrium it must be that W (ψn) :=W − V1 = 0. Or equivalently that
W (ψn) =
{
[1− ψn]n−1 − er∆V1 +
[
1− [1− ψn]n−1
]}
V2 = 0 (A4)
Step 3. Note that by the Binomial Theorem, [1− ψn]n−1 can be written as
[1− ψn]n−1 = 1− [n− 1]ψn +
υ=n−1∑
υ=2
(
n− 1
υ
)
[−ψn]υ
Step 4. The equilibrium distribution of entry times is exponential with hazard rate equal to
λn =
r [Πn+1 − psn]
[n− 1] psn
To establish this, we first use the result of step 3 in equation (A4) to obtain
W (ψn) = − (V2 − V1)
υ=n−1∑
υ=2
(
n− 1
υ
)
[−ψn]υ + [n− 1] [V2 − V1]ψn +
[
1− er∆]V1 = 0
Hence, as ∆→ 0, W (ψn) goes to
− (V2 − V1)
υ=n−1∑
υ=2
(
n− 1
υ
)
[−ψn]υ + [n− 1] [V2 − V1]ψn = 0
and thus the unique solution for ψn ∈ [0, 1] is ψn = 0. By using L’Hopital’s rule and the implicit
function theorem, it can be shown that the following limit
λn := lim
∆↓0
ψn(∆)
∆
is finite and well defined. For this reason, we can divided both sides of (A4) by ∆ and take the
limit of it when ∆ goes to zero
lim
∆↓0
{
− (V2 − V1)
υ=n−1∑
υ=2
(
n− 1
υ
)[
−ψn
∆
]υ
∆υ−1
}
+lim
∆↓0
{
[n− 1] [V2 − V1] ψn∆
}
+lim
∆↓0
[
1− er∆
∆
]
V1 = 0
It is evident that the limit of the first terms goes to zero as ∆ goes to zero and lim∆↓0
(
1− er∆) /∆ =
−r. So
λn =
rV1
[n− 1] [V2 − V1] =
r [Πn+1 − psn]
[n− 1] psn
Step 5. We show that p∗sn = κn.
We follow the same steps of previous propositions (i.e. Propositions 2 and 5). Assume that
the time of the first entry occurred at real time t ∈ [0,∞). Since the follower imitators would
enter the market with a zero delay, the inventor would obtain: (i) A flow of monopoly profits
up to time t; (ii) At time t, she would receive the price for the license psn; and (iii) A flow of
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profits equal to pin+1 from time t on. Hence, her payoff would be V ns (t, psn) =
pi1
r
[
1− e−rt] +
e−rt [psn +Πn+1]. But because now the time of the first entry t1 := min {ti, tj , ...tn} has an
exponential distribution with parameter nλn it follows that her expected payoff is
V ns (psn) =
pi1
[r + nλn]
+
nλn
[r + nλn]
[psn +Πn+1]
To conclude this step it suffices to show that the optimal price chosen by the inventor is equal
to κn. To accomplish this, observe that the innovator chooses a price, psn, to maximize Vs(psn)
subject to the hazard rate found in the previous step. So
dV ns (psn)
dpsn
=
∂λn
∂psn
rn
(r + nλn)
2 {−Π1 + psn +Πn+1}+
nλn
(r + nλn)
and since we have assumed that for all n ∈ P : (Πn+1 − κn) > 0 and psn ≤ κn, it follows that
suppsn [psn +Πn+1 −Π1] < 2Πn+1 − Π1 < 0 for all n ∈ P. Finally because ∂λn/∂psn < 0, it
ensues that dVs(psn)/dpsn > 0 for all psn ∈ (0, κn] and so p∗sn = κn as stated.
Step 6. When n→∞, V ns (κn)→ Π1.
To this end note that the innovator’s equilibrium payoff is
V ns (κn) =
pi1
[r + nλn]
+
nλn
[r + nλn]
[κn +Πn+1] ; for λn =
nr [Πn+1 − κn]
[n− 1]κn
So
lim
n→∞V
n
s (κn) = pi1 limn→∞
1
[r + nλn]
+ lim
n→∞
nλn
[r + nλn]
lim
n→∞ [κn +Πn+1]
And
lim
n→∞ (nλn) = r limn→∞
[
n
n− 1
]
lim
n→∞
[
Πn+1
κn
− 1
]
= 0
Because: (i) limn→∞
[
n
n−1
]
is bounded; and (ii) By assumption 3: limn→∞
[
Πn+1
κn
− 1
]
= 0.
Thus, because limn→∞ [κn +Πn+1] = 0, it follows directly that
lim
n→∞V
n
s (κn) = Π1
and the proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition 8. Because we focus on MPE, the payoff relevant history is deter-
mined by the number of imitators who are active in the market at each time period. Thus,
the following partition H := {Ha}, where Ha is a set that collects all those histories for which
a ∈ A = {0, 1, 2...} imitators are active in the market, is the coarsest sufficient partition that
allows us to define MPE. A strategy for the innovator, σs, is Markovian if it is measurable
with respect to the corresponding sets Ha. Formally, if the history ĥτ ∈ Ha(h˜τ ) for some a ∈ A
then the continuation strategy σs|bhτ must equal the continuation strategy σs|ehτ .
Measurability implies that the inventor’s strategy must prescribe the same list of prices
{psn}∞a=0 ∈ R+ ∪{+∞} for each period τ ≥ t at which the same number of active imitators are
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in the market.
Consider first the subgame following entry of at least one imitator. In particular let a be
the number of active imitators.
Step1: The unique symmetric markov perfect equilibrium is such that the innovator and all
a imitators offer n− a licenses at a zero price to all the remaining imitators.
First note that as in the case of the no-delay licensing equilibrium this is clearly a SPE. We
want to show however that it is the unique symmetric MPE.
As in previous proofs, we can show that entry necessarily occurs by licensing. If imitators
entered by copying there would be a profitable deviation for the active players.
Furthermore, when the license is sold it must be sold at a price of zero. Therefore, all
licenses are sold for a price of zero.
Step2: No imitator initially enters.
Given step 1, imitators know that if they are the first to enter, their profits after entry will
immediately be reduced to Πn+1. Furthermore, if K > n, Πn+1 < κ. Therefore the first entrant
expects profits of V1 = (1− δ)Π2+ δΠn+1−κ. And as δ → 1 and n→∞: V1 → Πn+1−κ < 0.
Thus entry cannot be profitable and the innovator keeps monopoly rents forever.
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